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NOCTURNAL JUVENILE CURFEW ORDINANCES: THE
FIFTH CIRCUIT "NARROWLY TAILORS" A DALLAS
ORDINANCE, BUT WILL SIMILAR ORDINANCES
ENCOUNTER THE SAME INTERPRETATION?
I. INTRODUCTION
On the evening of September 27, 1994, Terrell Collins, a fourteen-year-
old straight 'A' student who had earned a four year scholarship to a
Catholic high school, was gunned down in West Side Chicago.' Terrell's
death was not a typical gang-banger or drug-runner fatality.2 Until his
fateful last steps onto the West Side streets, he had possessed the good
sense and good fortune to avoid the carnage surrounding these glorified
!. John W. Fountain, More Street Injustice and Again Good Die Young, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 29,
1994, § 1, at 1. Although Terrell's death occurred at 8:39 p.m., beyond the purview of most curfews,
his tragic story is indicative of the juvenile crime and violence that happens most frequently during
curfew hours.
Between 1986 and 1991, nationwide homicide rates peaked between the hours of 9:00 p.m. and 6:00
a.m. OFFICE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE PLANS AND ANALYSIS HOMICIDE REPORTS (1992). Furthermore,
nearly 41% of all violent crimes between 1986 and 1991 occurred between the hours of midnight and
6:00 a.m. Id.
Overall juvenile crime rates have also dramatically increased. Violent crimes among teens increased
by 57% in the past decade. See Mark Potok, Cities Deciding That It's Time for Teen Curfews, USA
TODAY, June 6, 1994, at A3. Violent crimes are defined as homicide, forcible rape, robbery, and
aggravated assault. See 1988-1993 F.B.I. UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS. In 1988, juveniles comprised 8%
of all murder-related arrests. See 1988 F.B.I. UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS. In 1993, juveniles accounted
for 15% of murder-related arrests even though their percentage of the overall population had decreased.
See 1993 F.B.I. UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS. Additionally, juvenile crime victimization rates increased
by 23.4% from 1988 to 1993. See 1988-1993 F.B.I. UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS. See also Robert Davis,
Young People Victimized the Most, Study Says, USA TODAY, July 18, 1993 at 3A (citing a 1992 Justice
Department study, which reports that juveniles comprised only 10% of the population but accounted
for 23% of all crime victims). Per 100,000 people, juveniles aged 12 to 17, are violent crime victims
twice as often as adults ages 25 to 34, and five times as often as adults ages 35 and over. See also
Calif Mayor Urges Curfew to Cut Crime: 55 Murdered This Year in City 'Under Siege,' ATLANTA J.,
Mar. 25, 1992, at A9. In enacting a juvenile curfew ordinance, the Oakland mayor stated, "Our city is
in dire distress from the wave of violence that has been building over the last ten years . ... The
homicide figures since the beginning of this year have certainly brought us to a critical mass where we
must take some action." Id.
2. See Fountain, supra note 1, § 1, at 7. The article refers to another disturbing violent story that
occurred among gang-bangers only a week before Terrell's death. Apparently, Chicago police were
searching for an eleven year-old boy who had recently slain a fourteen year-old. Id. The manhunt
summarily ended when police discovered that members of his own gang had already murdered their
associate. Id.
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urban enterprises. Lately, tragedies like Terrell's have become all too
common.
3
Chicago,4 and many other areas' of the United States, have recently
suffered marked increases in juvenile crime and victimization. Civic
organizations, city councils, state legislatures, and other concerned citizens
groups have promulated a seemingly endless list of activities and programs
in efforts to curb juvenile violence.6 Unfortunately, most efforts have
3. Terrell's death adds to the already appallingly large number of murders in the United States
in recent years. See 1993 F.B.I. UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 14 (indicating 23,271 murders in the United
States in 1993). United States Senator Daniel P. Moynihan recently offered sociological insight into
America's endemic problem with epidemic violence. Daniel P. Moynihan, What is Normal? Defining
Deviancy Down, CURRENT, Sept. 1993, at 12. Moynihan postulates that modem American society
refuses to confront juvenile violence and its attendant consequences. Id. at 15. Moynihan opines that
society has lowered the threshold of normalcy to accommodate rising deviancy. Id. He underscores his
position by comparing the nation's horror when seven gangsters were killed in the St. Valentine's Day
Massacre of 1929. Id. Congress promptly responded by ending prohibition. Id. The carnage of that
massacre pales in comparison to many weekend body counts in large cities like New York and Los
Angeles. Furthermore, Moynihan observes that societal response to the appalling violence and death has
regressed from outrage to banal "shoulder-shrugging." Id. at 22.
Another public official concerned with American society's acceptance of violence, New York
Supreme Court Judge Edwin Torres, urges citizens to act: "[T]his numbness, this near narcoleptic state
can diminish the human condition . ... A society that loses its sense of outrage is doomed to
extinction." Id. at 23. See also, The Price of Life, USA TODAY, Dec. 9, 1993, at 14A.
Together, the positions of Moynihan and Torres form a theoretical justification for the adoption of
nocturnal juvenile curfews. Historically, towns created curfews to reestablish order during riots and
other violent situations. See infra notes 40-44 and accompanying text. Modem curfew proponents have
extended this "emergency response" rationale to justify curfews as a response to the epidemic violence
and riot conditions that permanently plague many modem communities. For a discussion of this
violence, see supra note 1. In effect, contemporary town councils utilize nocturnal curfews to attempt
to return society to "normalcy" during a disproportionately violent period.
4. In 1993, 33% of Chicago's 850 homicide victims were between the ages of I 1 and 20,
establishing a new record. An Epidemic of Juvenile Crime, CHI. TRIB., July 29, 1994, at 18.
5. In Baltimore, the number ofjuveniles who were fatally shot jumped from 26 in 1988 to 41
in 1992. Paul W. Valentine, New Curfew in Baltimore: Parents of Violators Face Tougher Penalties,
WASH. POST, July 29, 1994, at Al. Additionally, during the same time period, the number ofjuveniles
wounded by gunfire rose from 179 to 316 and the number arrested for drug distribution increased from
666 to 1,373. Id. In 1992, Florida juveniles, setting new state records, accounted for 45% of auto thefts,
36% of burglaries, 25% of robberies, 15% of rapes, and 12.5% of murders. Diane Hirth, Fla.
Legislators Weigh Imposing Statewide Juvenile Curfew, FORT LAUDERDALE SUN-SENTINEL, Dec. 19,
1993, at A2. In an alarming statistic, Fulton County, Georgia recently reported homicide as the leading
cause of juvenile death. And a Creative Approach in Fulton, ATL. CONST., Oct. 23, 1994, at D4
[hereinafter Creative Approach].
6. The programs created to restrain juvenile violence have ranged from conventional to bizarre.
In Fulton County, Georgia, the legislature enacted a bill, modeled after cigarette and alcohol packaging
requirements, mandating that gun dealers affix warning labels to firearms. Creative Approach, supra
note 5, at D4. Although such approaches are seemingly futile considering the ineffectiveness of alcohol
and cigarette packaging warnings, proponents believe the labels may force owners to contemplate the
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proven futile.7
The epidemic violence has driven legislatures to return to a crime-
fighting measure that, until recently,' many critics had dismissed as an
unconstitutional boondoggle: the juvenile curfew ordinance. While even
proponents concede that curfew statutes will never be a panacea,9 curfews
attached safety tips and health hazards before firing away. Id.
Many suburban Chicago town councils have enacted "parental responsibility" laws empowering local
police to prosecute parents for their children's crimes. Christi Parsons & Andrew Martin, Party's Over,
Even for Parents: Suburbs Making Them Pay If Teens Break the Law, CHI. Tim., Oct. 1, 1994, at Al.
Although most of these ordinances are aimed at curbing juvenile revelry, many extend to curfew
violations, weapon offenses, or driving while intoxicated offenses. Id.
For discussions of some of the more common juvenile crime control schemes, see Robert Becker,
Late-night Games Take Place of Crime: Enhanced Recreation Programs Hailed For Making Streets
Safer, CH. TRIB., Oct. 25, 1994, at Al (examining late night recreational programs in a Cincinnati
suburb that include late-night basketball, teen dance programs, field trips, tutoring, and sewing classes);
Ruben Castaneda, Police Launch Initiatives to Cut Juvenile Crime, WASH. POST, Oct. 28, 1993, at Cl
(reporting on a "leaming center" for juveniles suspended from high school that is staffed by volunteer
retired teachers, counselors, and a police officer, and operated at a Washington D.C. police boys and
girls club); Bruce Frankel, Teen Crime Surge Sparks Crackdown, USA TODAY, Mar. 17, 1994, at 1
(considering the utility of truancy programs and shopping mall bans); How to Make Curfews Work, L.A.
TIMES, June 13, 1994, at B6 (noting the effectiveness of an East Los Angeles curfew provision
mandating that families of curfew violators attend peaceful conflict resolution classes); Deborah Sharp,
Cities Try Curfews to Take Time Out of Crime, USA TODAY, Dec. 28, 1993, at 6A (discussing plans
to adopt gang intervention and juvenile job programs).
Additionally, for discussion of a creative but highly controversial and constitutionally tenuous
attempt at controlling juvenile gang violence, see Seth Mydans, New Anti-Gang Weapon: Bar Legal
Conduct, N.Y. Times, June 11, 1995, at Al (focusing on injunctions that identify known gang members
by name and prohibit them, solely on the basis of past gang-related crimes from "engaging in specified
activities that in many cases are perfectly legal for everybody else [such as] sitting in parks, climbing
trees or roofs, whistling, making gang hand signals, wearing large belt buckles or carrying bottles,
baseball bats or flashlights").
7. In an indicative about-face, Chicago public guardian and lifetime welfare reformer Patrick
Murphy argued that the social programs of the child welfare system are part of the problem of juvenile
violence, rather than the solution. Thomas Hardy, 'Fallen' Liberal Urges Tough Welfare, Crime
Reforms, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 30, 1994, at 1. Murphy emphasizes that, "draconian measures are needed to
stem [the] epidemic of youth crime," and adds that, "[welfare] is a horrible, patronizing, racist message
and we've got to turn it around." Id.
However, some juvenile crime prevention programs have been successful. In San Jose, California,
daytime burglaries have dropped by 50% since the inception of its truancy program in 1981. Frankel,
supra note 6. Similarly, in Oklahoma City, daytime burglaries decreased by 33% in the first two years
of its truancy crackdown. Id. In Winston Hills, Texas, after the implementation of a late-night recreation
program, arrests dropped from 645 in the first six months of 1992 to 491 for the same period in 1993,
approximately a 25% decrease. Becker, supra note 6.
8. In the past five years, legislators have enacted or amended over 1,000 curfew ordinances. Peter
Pae, Leesburg to Enforce Curfew, WASH. POST, Oct. 6, 1994, at Vl.
9. Don Postell, a Dallas assistant city attorney who helped draft a curfew ordinance that withstood
constitutional scrutiny, see infra notes 14-25 and accompanying text, stresses that legislators should not
naively assume that curfews are "magic weapons." Sharp, supra note 6.
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can be surprisingly effective." Of course, municipalities that fail to
adequately consider the time, effort, and money necessary to implement
effective curfew programs will find curfews to be ineffective. However,
municipalities with meticulous legislators and police forces committed to
prudent enforcement" of their curfew ordinances will succeed in reducing
crime." The most successful curfews are not isolated remedies, but those
incorporated into larger programs aimed at controlling municipal crime.'3
On June 12, 1991, in response to public demands to protect Dallas
citizens from a recent outbreak of juvenile crime, the Dallas City Council
enacted a juvenile curfew ordinance. 4 The Council enumerated four
10. Cities significantly reducing juvenile crime through curfews include; Denver, Colorado; New
Orleans, Louisiana; Phoenix, Arizona; and San Antonio, Texas. After Denver's implementation of a
curfew, the incidence of serious crimes, including homicide, assault, robbery, and burglary, decreased
by 30%, and the number of juveniles arrested for homicides dropped 60%. Darryl Fears, Urban
Spotlight, Focus on Cities, Problems, Solutions, Trends, ATL. CONsT., Oct. 9, 1994, at D3. In the first
two months after New Orleans initiated curfew enforcement, the city experienced a comparable decrease
in juvenile crime, and police detained over 2,000 juveniles in the city's Curfew Center. Id. At the
center, police and volunteers counsel curfew violators until parents pick up their children. Id.
Subsequent to the adoption of a curfew, juvenile victimization in San Antonio dropped by 14% between
1991 and 1992. SAN ANTONIO YOUTH CURFEW REPORT, Aug. 20, 1992. Furthermore, San Antonio
curfew arrest reports disprove criticism that police discriminately administer such curfews. Id. There
is a close demographic correlation between racial population and arrest ratios (the largest gap being 2%
among Hispanics). Id.
Atlanta recently amended its curfew in an attempt to revamp failed crime-fighting efforts. See
ATLANTA, GA., CODE § 17-7002, -7003 (1990). Nevertheless, these good intentions have failed because
Atlanta police refuse to enforce the remodeled ordinance. See Fears, at D3. In 1993, both Phoenix and
Denver police issued more than 3,000 curfew violation tickets in 1993 whereas Atlanta police issued
only 270. Id. Because Phoenix's population is over twice that of Atlanta's, the figure illustrates the
massive disparity. THE 1994 INFORMATION PLEASE ALMANAC 793, 808 (listing Phoenix's population
as 983,403 and Atlanta's as 394,017).
11. Police enforcement is the key to the success or failure of curfews. Police receptiveness varies
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. See, e.g., Fears, supra note 10 (quoting an Atlanta police chief who
stated: "We tell our patrols to vigorously enforce the curfew law. we look at curfews as a crime-
fighting tool."); Indira A.R. Lakshmanan & Michael Grunwald, Violating Curfew: Chelsea Ordinance
Seldom Enforced, BOSTON GLOBE, June 5, 1994, at 29 (quoting Chelsea police chief who sees the
curfew as a deterrent that "ideally,... encourages voluntary compliance," and another police officer
who "said with a shrug... 'we could make curfew arrests all night long. But what would be the point
of that?"); Valentine, supra note 5 (reporting, not surprisingly, that police will not give top priority to
a recently adopted Baltimore curfew).
12. For crime reduction statistics in cities where legislators have adopted curfews, see supra note
10.
13. See Richard T. Ford, Note, Juvenile Curfews and Gang Violence: Exiled on Main Street, 107
HARV. L. REv. 1693, 1710 (1994) (suggesting the use of curfews "as part of a comprehensive response
to the social and economic ills that beset urban areas and ... not [as] an end in themselves").
14. Dallas, Tex., Ordinance 20,966 (June 12, 1991), cited in Qutb v. City of Dallas, No. 3:91-CN-
1310-R, slip op. at 5 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 10, 1992). The City of Dallas amended this initial ordinance in
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purposes for the curfew: first, to protect minors from each other and from
other persons; second, to protect the general public; third, to promote
parental responsibility and control of children; and fourth, to reduce
juvenile crime and victimization. 5 Two weeks after the Council passed
the statute, four Dallas parents, challenged the ordinance's constitutional-
ity, 6 seeking both a temporary restraining order and a permanent
injunction. 7 The District Court for the Northern District of Texas enjoined
the enforcement of the curfew, holding the ordinance to be violative of the
First and Fourteenth Amendment rights of free association and equal
protection. 8
In Qutb v. Strauss,9 the Fifth Circuit overturned the district court's
ruling. The court applied a "strict scrutiny" test" and held that the Dallas
June of 1992. Qutb, No. 3:91-CN-1310-R, slip op. at 11. For the sake of clarity, this Note refers only
to the amended version. DALLAS, TEX., CITY CODE ch. 31, § 31-33 (June 10, 1992), reprinted in Qutb
v. Strauss, 11 F.3d 488, at 496-99 (5th Cir. 1992). For the full text of the amended Dallas ordinance,
stee Appendix, infra.
15. See Appendix, infra. The overriding purpose of the ordinance is summarized in the final two
"whereas" clauses: to protect the "public health, safety, and general welfare" and "diminish the
undesirable impact of [the prescribed] conduct on the citizens of the city of Dallas." Id.
16. The parents filed suit both individually and as next friends of their teenage children. Qutb v.
Strauss, 11 F.3d 488, 491 (5th Cir. 1993). Subsequently, the suit was certified as a class action with
two subclasses: persons under the age of seventeen, and parents of persons under the age of seventeen.
Id.
17. Id. The parents originally claimed seven constitutional violations: 1) violation of the children's
First Amendment rights of free association and free speech; 2) violation of the children's Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendment right against unreasonable search and seizure; 3) violation of the children's Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendment rights to a presumption of innocence, proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and
freedom against self-incrimination; 4) violation of the children's and parent's Fourteenth Amendment
Due Process rights of fundamental liberty and privacy; 5) violation of the children's Fourteenth
Amendment right to equal protection under the law; 6) overbreadth; and 7) vagueness. Id. at 491 n.4.
The district court held the ordinance unconstitutional on free association and equal protection grounds;
therefore, the court did not significantly address the other arguments the plaintiffs posed. Id. at 491 n.5.
In reversing the district court, the Fifth Circuit focused on the equal protection challenge, but also
addressed the First Amendment and privacy arguments. Id. at 492, 494-96 & n.9.
18. Quib, No. 3:91-CN-1310-R, slip op. at 30-35, 42-43.
19. 11 F.3d 488 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. denied sub nom. Qutb v. Bartlett, 114 S. Ct. 2134 (1994).
20. Although the strict scrutiny test varies slightly depending on the plaintiff's specific
constitutional challenge, a uniform two prong inquiry emerges. Compare Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S.
535, 541 (1942) (striking down a sterilization statute under strict scrutiny analysis as an impermissible
invasion of marriage and procreation because it violated the equal protection clause) with Ward v. Rock
Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (quoting Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence,
468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984) (establishing, under the First Amendment, that "the government may impose
reasonable restrictions on the time, place, or manner of protected speech provided [they] 'are narrowly
tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and that they leave open ample alternative channels
for communication")). First, the ordinance must promote a compelling governmental interest. 11 F.3d
at 492. Second, the statute must be narrowly tailored to meet only that compelling state interest, with
Washington University Open Scholarship
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City Council had a compelling state interest in enacting the curfew.2 The
Fifth Circuit concluded that the curfew was narrowly tailored to achieve
only the stated interest,' and that the curfew was the least restrictive
means of accomplishing the Council's objective.23 The court also noted
that the ordinance was not violative of the First Amendment, because
juveniles exercising their First Amendment rights were excluded from the
scope of the ordinance's coverage.24 Additionally, the ordinance did not
unconstitutionally intrude upon the parents' fundamental right of privacy
or their right to raise children without undue governmental interference.2
The Qutb case is the first federal decision in seventeen years to uphold
a juvenile curfew ordinance, and the only federal decision ever to uphold
an ordinance under "strict scrutiny" analysis.26 The Supreme Court has
"no less restrictive means available to effectuate the desired end." Id.
21. 11 F.3d 488, 492. The Qutb court noted that the Dallas City Council had a compelling interest
in protecting juveniles and decreasing juvenile crime. Id. at 493. For the stated purpose of the ordinance,
see supra note 15 and accompanying text.
22. 11 F.3d 488, 493-94. The Qutb court highlighted the ordinance's carefully drafted exemptions
by contrasting it with a sweeping curfew the Fifth Circuit had declared unconstitutional twelve years
before in Johnson v. City of Opelousas, 658 F.2d 1065, 1073 (5th Cir. 1981). In Johnson, the court
found a curfew ordinance overbroad and unconstitutional because it prohibited minors from traveling
to or from school or religious activities, strolling on the sidewalk or yard of their homes, engaging in
legitimate employment, or interstate travel through the city. Id. at 1072-74. The court had implied,
however, that a curfew with a sufficiently narrow scope could survive constitutional scrutiny. Id. at
1074.
23. 11 F.3d at 493-95. Under more recent Supreme Court cases analyzing other statutes with time,
place, and manner restrictions on free speech, the ordinances need not implement the least restrictive
means. See Ward, 491 U.S. at 797-98.
24. 11 F.3d at 494. See also Appendix, infra § I(C)(I)(H). The court conceded that the ordinance
necessarily restricts First Amendment rights. Id. However, the court questioned whether a fundamental
right to freedom of social association even exists for juveniles. 11 F.3d at 495 n.9 (quoting Dallas v.
Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 25 (1989)). The court reasoned that the First Amendment exception exempted
most associational activities and concluded that "any negligible burden on the individual's right to
associate is outweighed by the compelling interest of the state." Id. The Qutb court held, and the
plaintiffs conceded, that reducing juvenile crime and victimization and promoting juvenile safety were
compelling state interests. Id. at 492. The court concluded by stating that any infringement upon
juveniles' constitution rights "will be minimal," and thus apparently allowable. Id. at 495.
25. 11 F.3d at 495-96. The court recognized the fundamental right of parents to "rear their children
without undue government influence." Id. at 495 (citing Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639
(1968)). However, the court reasoned that the ordinance "presents only a minimal intrusion into the
parents' rights" because it only infringed upon their right to allow children, "unaccompanied by a parent
or guardian or other authorized person," in public areas during curfew hours. Id. at 495-96. The court
again highlighted the exemptions and emphasized that parents "may still allow child[ren] to hold a job,
to perform an errand, and to seek help in emergency situations." Id. at 496; see also Appendix, Infra.
26. Qutb v. City of Dallas, No. 3: 91-CN-1310-R, slip op. at 32 n.70. The only other federal court
upholding a curfew ordinance utilized rational relationship review. See Bykofsky v. Borough of
Middletown, 401 F. Supp. 1242, 1265 (M.D. Pa. 1975). For a discussion of strict scrutiny and rational
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never resolved the constitutionality of juvenile curfew ordinances. Indeed,
its only statement regarding the issue came in a dissent from a denial of
certiorari.27 In Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown,28 Justice Marshall
joined by Justice Brennan,29 focused on whether juveniles are entitled to
the same due process rights as are adults.3" Justice Marshall believed that
this issue required resolution because of the Court's ambiguous precedent
regarding juvenile's fundamental rights.31 He attacked the constitutionality
of curfew ordinances aimed at all citizens but declined to opine about the
constitutionality of nocturnal juvenile curfews.32 In denying certiorari to
Qutb seventeen years later, the Supreme Court again refused to address the
constitutionality of juvenile curfew ordinances.33
Primarily because the exemption clauses equitably balanced efficacy and
constitutionality,34 the Fifth Circuit interpreted the Dallas ordinance as a
narrowly tailored statute. Despite this favorable ruling, room for
improvement remains.36 First, the Dallas ordinance lacks clear enforce-
ment provisions and consequently fails to provide uniform standards for
police officers implementing the ordinance.37 Second, because the Fifth
Circuit failed to clarify the sweeping First Amendment curfew exemption,
application of these exemptions is likely to be haphazard.38 Nevertheless,
until a federal court overturns a similar curfew,39 the Dallas ordinance will
relationship review, see infra notes 55-61 and accompanying text.
27. See Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown, 429 U.S. 964 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
28. Id.
29. Id. Justice White was also willing to grant certiorari but did not join Justice Marshall's dissent.
Id.
30. Id. at 965. A little over two years later the Court answered this inquiry in the negative. Bellotti
v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 633-39 (1979). For a more complete analysis of Bellotti, see infra notes 51-61
and accompanying text.
31. 429 U.S. at 965.
32. Id.
33. Qutb v. Bartlett, 114 S. Ct. 2134 (1994).
34. See Qutb v. Strauss, 11 F.3d 488, 494-95 (emphasizing the differences between the Opelousas
curfew ordinance, struck down by the same court 13 years earlier in Johnson v. City of Opelousas, 658
F.2d 1065 (5th Cir. 1991), and the Dallas ordinance, which the court upheld). The Opelousas ordinance
only included two exemptions: when "said minor is accompanied by his parents, tutor or other
responsible adult or [when] said minor is upon an emergency errand." Opelousas, 658 F.2d at 1067 n.1.
On the other hand, the Dallas curfew includes nine "defenses." See Appendix, infra.
35. Qutb, 11 F.3d 488, 496 (5th Cir. 1993).
36. See infra notes 158-89 and accompanying text.
37. See infra notes 62-79 and accompanying text.
38. See infra notes 85-114, 155, 167-69 and accompanying text.
39. Other courts faced with constitutional challenges to similar curfews may not adopt as charitable
a review as the Fifth Circuit. See, e.g., Pred v. Dade County, No. 94-03203-CA-21 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Sept.
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persist as a benchmark for cities across the country.
This Note asserts that, even though the Qutb court upheld the Dallas
juvenile curfew ordinance, future drafters should modify the Dallas
framework to further insulate such ordinances from constitutional attack.
Part II traces the history of curfews from their inception to their modern-
day application as crime fighting measures. Part III focuses on typical
constitutional attacks on nocturnal juvenile curfew ordinances. Part IV
discusses and critiques the Qutb decision. Part V compares the Dallas
curfew with other municipal curfews and proposes methods that drafters
can utilize to deter constitutional challenges. Part VI concludes that only
nocturnal juvenile curfew ordinances that legislators carefully and skillfully
draft will continue to withstand constitutional challenges and judicial
scrutiny.
II. HISTORY OF CURFEW ORDINANCES
Laws requiring people to vacate streets and public areas during nighttime
hours have existed for centuries.40 Traditionally, federal, state, and
municipal legislatures have enacted curfews under emergency and police
21, 1994). The Pred court invalidated a Dade County juvenile curfew ordinance because it violated the
fundamental right to privacy awarded to Floridians by the state constitution, which "embraces more
privacy interests and extends more protection to individuals in those interests than does the [F]ederal
[C]onstitution." Id., slip op. at 12, 14. The court explicitly distinguished the Dade County curfew from
the Dallas curfew at issue in Qutb in two ways. First, Quib involved the Federal Constitution rather than
the more stringent Florida Constitution. Id. at 14. Second, the plaintiffs in Qutb stipulated that the
Dallas curfew served a compelling state interest, whereas the plaintiffs in Pred did not, and the
defendant was unable to establish such an interest. Id. In fact, the Pred court argued that even if Dade
County had established a compelling state interest, the curfew was not the least restrictive means of
achieving the interest. Id. at 14-15.
Additionally, the court compared a San Antonio, Texas curfew to Dade County's ordinance,
highlighting the shortcomings of the latter. Id. at 7; see also San Antonio, Tex., Ordinance 76,419 (Sept.
3, 1992). The court criticized Dade County's ordinance's punitive rather than preventative approach,
its failure to empower police to detain curfew violating juveniles in a holding facility, and most
importantly, its failure to simultaneously implement "educational, social, vocational, and recreational
programs designed to reduce juvenile recidivism." Id. See also supra note 6.
40. See generally Note, Assessing the Scope ofMinors'Fundamental Rights: Juvenile.Curfews and
the Constitution, 97 HARV. L. REv. 1163 n.2 (1984). The term "curfew" likely derived from the french
word covrefeu, 'to cover the fire,' which referenced feudal laws requiring citizens to rake coals over
their hearths at dusk and retire for the evening. Id. (citing BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 344 (5th ed.
1979)). Apparently these "curfews" originated in eleventh-century England during the reign of William
the Conqueror. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 381 (6th ed. 1990). There is also evidence that towns in
Normandy, France, and Spain started enforcing similar laws during the same time period. Id. More
recently, legislative curfews have expanded to include periods where citizens must stay indoors during
wars or civil commotions. See Note, infra, at 1164 n.7 (referencing such curfews).
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powers to control civil disorders, riots, and epidemics. 4' Nocturnal
juvenile curfew ordinances originated at the beginning of this century,
primarily to supplement the perceived inadequate parenting that legislators
attributed to the large influx of immigrants entering the United States.42
The use of curfews subsided until World War II, when many legislatures
adopted nocturnal juvenile curfews in response to the war's massive
displacement of parents overseas and the attendant difficulties in preventing
juveniles from remaining in public areas late at night.43 More recently,
municipal legislatures have enacted and amended curfews to combat
juvenile crime and victimization caused by drug and gang related violence.4
Although courts have almost uniformly upheld emergency curfews
41. See, e.g., United States v. Chalk, 441 F.2d 1277 (4th Cir. 1971) (holding emergency curfew
instituted during race riots constitutional); ACLU v. Chandler, 458 F. Supp. 456 (W.D. Tenn. 1978)
(upholding emergency curfew adopted during local policemen's strike). The Supreme Court also has
upheld, rather ignominiously, the constitutionality of emergency curfews imposed upon Japanese-
Americans during World War II. See Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943) (holding an
emergency curfew applicable only to Japanese-Americans to be constitutionally valid); Yasui v. United
States, 320 U.S. 115 (1943) (same).
42. Note, supra note 40, at 1164 n.9. Approximately 3,000 municipalities adopted curfews at the
beginning of this century. Id. See also Note, Curfew Ordinances and the Control of Nocturnal Juvenile
Crime, 107 U. PA. L. REV. 66 (1958) [hereinafter Cuifew Ordinances].
43. Curfew Ordinances, supra note 42, at 67 n.5.
44. See PHOENIX, ARiz., CODE § 22-1 (1993); DENVER, COLO., CODE § 34-61 (1994); Washington,
D.C., Juvenile Curfew Amendment Act of 1995 (to be codified at D.C. CODE ANN. § 11-48 (1996));
Little Rock, Ark., Ordinance 16,564 (Jan. 4, 1994), ordinance 16,602 (Feb. 15, 1994); Dade County,
Fl., Ordinance 94-1 (Jan. 18, 1994); ORLANDO, FL., CODE § 43-80 (1994); New Orleans, La., Ordinance
16,498 (May 31, 1994); BALTIMORE, MD., § 96, art. 19 (1993) (act withdrawn 1995); Austin, Tex.,
Ordinance 900531-C (May 31, 1990), Ordinance 920409-K (Apr. 9, 1992); San Antonio, Tex.,
Ordinance 76,419 (Sept. 3, 1992). Baltimore government officials decided to cease enforcement of and
remodel their curfew after the highest court in Maryland found the language "bona fide organization"
unconstitutionally vague and invalidated a duplicative Frederick, Maryland curfew. See Ashton v.
Brown, 660 A.2d 447 (Md. 1995). See also Melody Simmons, Baltimore Halts Discredited Curfew,
BALT. SUN, July 8, 1995, at AI; Retooled Curfew Law in Baltimore, WASH. POST, July 28, 1995, at
D6 (modeling the new ordinance after the Dallas curfew). For a discussion of the vagueness challenge
to curfews, see infra notes 62-79 and accompanying text.
Neither the Baltimore nor Frederick city councils modeled their ordinances after the Dallas
ordinance, thus limiting the persuasive effect of the Qutb decision. Presumably, Baltimore's officials
reacted in an attempt to forestall similar suits because the Court of Appeals of Maryland remanded
Brown to a lower court to determine whether the city of Frederick was liable for assault and battery and
false imprisonment. Id at 469-74.
In Brown, during "early morning hours," police officers entered a Baltimore restaurant and,
believing one of the plaintiffs to be a curfew-violating juvenile, photographed, handcuffed, and searched
a nineteen-year-old patron. Id. at 452-53. Brown responded by filing a potpourri of legal claims
including overbreadth, vagueness, First and Fourteenth Amendment violations, Maryland Declaration
of Rights violations, assault and battery, false imprisonment, invasion of privacy, intentional infliction
of emotional distress, negligence, and gross negligence. Id. at 454.
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premised on state or federal emergency police powers,45 courts have not
developed a distinct standard for evaluating the constitutionality of non-
emergency nocturnal juvenile curfew ordinances. Not surprisingly, courts
addressing this issue have reached strikingly different conclusions. 46
Nevertheless, in modem times, courts generally agree that the first step in
resolving curfew constitutionality is determining whether curfews infringe
upon juveniles' fundamental rights. 47
III. CONSTITUTIONAL ATrACKS
Courts have found a myriad of constitutional deficiencies in curfew
ordinances. 48 This section focuses first on the core, and often determina-
tive issue, of whether the Constitution grants the same fundamental
45. See supra note 38 and cases cited therein; North Carolina v. Dobbins, 178 S.E.2d 449 (N.C.
1971) (holding that the enactment of an emergency curfew was within the state's police power to
control fires and destruction of property during riots); Glover v. District of Columbia, 250 A.2d 556
(D.C. 1969) (upholding an emergency curfew barring all citizens except firemen, sanitation workers,
police, and medical workers from public areas during a riot). See also John F. Dienelt, Note, Judicial
Control of the Riot Curfew, 77 YALE L.J. 1560 (1968); and Glenn C. Frese, Comment, The Riot Curfew,
57 CAL. L. REv. 450 (1969).
46. Courts have applied "strict scrutiny" analysis, "rational relationship" analysis, the "void for
vagueness" doctrine, and the "overbreadth doctrine." For further explanation of these tests and example
cases, see infra supra notes 51-98 and accompanying text. Frequently, because plaintiffs lodge multiple
constitutional claims, courts must apply several similar tests. See, e.g., Johnson v. City of Opelousas,
658 F.2d 1065, 1071-74 (5th Cir. 1981) (expressly limiting its holding to the overbrcadth of the
ordinance); Ruff v. Marshall, 438 F. Supp. 303, 305-06 (M.D. Ga. 1977) (invalidating ordinance
because of unconstitutional overbreadth); Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown, 401 F. Supp. 1242,
1248-50, 1257-58 (M.D. Pa. 1975) (engaging in both vagueness and rational relationship inquiries),
affid without op., 535 F.2d 1245 (3d Cir.), and cert. denied, 429 U.S. 964 (1976).
47. If juveniles and adults enjoyed the same fundamental rights in all circumstances, juvenile
nocturnal curfew ordinances would undoubtably be unconstitutional absent a state of emergency or
equivalent state interesL See Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown, 429 U.S. 964, 965 (1976) (Marshall,
J., dissenting) (declaring that, "absent a genuine emergency, a curfew aimed at all citizens could not
survive constitutional scrutiny" even if it would protect their safety and prevent "nocturnal mischiet").
However, the Supreme Court has determined that juvenile and adult fundamental rights are not
coextensive. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 623, 634 (1979) (recognizing that the "constitutional rights of
children cannot be equated with those of adults"). For analysis of Bellotti, see infra notes 5 1-61 and
accompanying text.
48. See, e.g., Johnson v. City of Opelousas, 658 F.2d 1065, 1074 (invalidating a curfew solely on
overbreadth grounds); Naprstek v. City of Norwich, 545 F.2d 815, 819 (2d Cir. 1976) (holding a curfew
invalid on vagueness grounds because it failed to specify at what hour the curfew ended); Waters v.
Barry, 711 F. Supp. 1125, 1132-40 (D.D.C. 1989) (invalidating D.C. curfew because it violated the Due
Process and Equal Protection Clause, of the Fifth Amendment); MeCollester v. City of Keene, 586 F.
Supp. 1381, 1386 (D.N.H. 1984) (holding that a municipal curfew was overbroad and violative of the
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause); see also infra notes 51-150 and accompanying text.
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protections to juveniles that it provides to adults.49 The remainder of this
section discusses constitutional issues that stem from this initial inquiry. 0
A. Bellotti v. Baird/Substantive Due Process Rights
In Bellotti v. Baird,"t the seminal case examining juvenile constitutional
rights, the Supreme Court recognized that juvenile rights are not coexten-
sive with adult rights in all situations. 2 The Court cited three justifications
for its position: "the peculiar vulnerability of children; their inability to
make critical decisions in an informed, mature manner; and the importance
of the parental role in child rearing."53
Following Bellotti, most courts have utilized the Bellotti factors to
determine which juvenile rights are fundamental rights, and to what degree
a curfew infringes upon such rights. 4 Depending on the answers to these
inquiries, courts couple the Bellotti test with either the "rational relation-
ship"55 or the "strict scrutiny" test. 6 Courts concluding that curfews do
49. See infra notes 51-61 and accompanying text.
50. See infra notes 62-150 and accompanying text.
51. 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
52. Id. at 634. In Bellotti, the Court invalidated a Massachusetts statute requiring parental consent,
or parental notification and judicial approval, before a physician could perform an abortion on an
unmarried woman under the age of 18. Id. at 625, 651. The Court found that the statute's consent
provision "unduly burdened" the juvenile's constitutional rights to seek an abortion by imposing
conditions upon her initial access to court. Id. at 647. The Court reasoned that a juvenile should be
granted an opportunity to receive unrestricted judicial evaluation of her maturity and decision making
ability. Id.
53. Id. at 634. See also Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 444 (1990) (emphasizing that the
state "has a strong and legitimate interest in the welfare of its young citizens, whose immaturity,
inexperience, and lack ofjudgement may sometimes impair their ability to exercise their rights wisely').
54. See Katherine H. Federle, Children, Curfews, and the Constitution, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 1315,
1337 (1995) (indicating that twelve out of the sixteen courts reviewing curfew constitutionality since
Bellotti have utilized its analysis). Including the Eleventh Judicial Circuit court of Florida's citation to
Bellotti in Pred v. Dade County, No. 94-03203-CA-21 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Sept. 21, 1994), thirteen out of
seventeen courts reviewing curfews have utilized Bellotti. Courts that apply Bellotti include Waters v.
Barry, 711 F. Supp. 1125, 1136-37 (D.D.C. 1989) (applying Bellotti factors to invalidate a curfew
ordinance); McCollester v. City of Keene, 586 F. Supp. 1381, 1385-86 (D.N.H. 1984) (using Bellotti
factors to determine "validity of restraints on minors [that] would be unconstitutional if placed on
adults," and finding an infringement of fundamental privacy rights); People ex rel. J.M., 768 P.2d 219,
223 (Colo. 1989) (utilizing the Bellotti test and finding no fundamental right infringement); City of
Panora v. Simmons, 445 N.W.2d 363, 368-69 (Iowa 1989) (applying the Bellotti test and upholding
restrictions on a juvenile's non-fundamental right of intracity travel).
55. See infra note 58 and accompanying text. For cases applying this test in other constitutional
arenas, see Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1974) (applying the rational relationship
test in upholding the constitutionality of "economic and social legislation" restricting land use to one-
family dwellings); Euclid v. Amber Realty, 272 U.S. 365, 391, 395-96 (1926) (utilizing rational
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not infringe upon a juvenile's fundamental rights apply the rational
relationship test." Application of rational relationship review increases the
likelihood of constitutional validity because the state need only prove that
the ordinance is rationally related to the ends of preventing juvenile crime
and victimization.58 Conversely, courts finding that curfews necessarily
infringe upon the fundamental rights of juveniles apply the strict scrutiny
test. 9 Under more burdensome strict scrutiny analysis, the state must
prove that the ordinance is narrowly drawn to meet a compelling state
interest.6" Application of strict scrutiny usually results in invalidation of
the examined law.6'
Thus, the Bellotti test is critical because it determines which standard a
court uses to evaluate the validity of a curfew, and the concomitant level
of proof the municipality must meet. However, it is only a preliminary
inquiry prefacing the many intricate constitutional issues presented in
relationship test and finding zoning ordinance to be a "valid exercise of authority").
56. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
57. See, e.g., Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown, 401 F. Supp. 1242, 1256-58 (M.D. Pa. 1975);
People ex rel. J.M., 768 P.2d 219, 223-24 (Colo. 1989) (applying rational relationship test because it
is clear that constitutional rights of juveniles and adults are not coextensive); City of Panom v.
Simmons, 445 N.W.2d 363, 367-69 (Iowa 1989) (upholding a curfew under the rational relationship
test); People v. Walton, 161 P.2d 498, 501 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1945) (using rational
relationship analysis because juveniles and adults do not enjoy coextensive protection of fundamental
rights).
58. Bykofsky, 401 F. Supp. at 1265.
59. See, e.g., Johnson v. City of Opelousas, 658 F.2d 1065, 1074 (5th Cir. 1981) (using strict
scrutiny to invalidate a curfew because of insufficient exemptions); Waters v. Barry, 711 F. Supp. 1125,
1138 (D.D.C. 1989) (invalidating a Washington, D.C. curfew under strict scrutiny because it is a "bull
in a china shop of constitutional values'); People v. Chambers, 335 N.E.2d 612, 617 (IlI. App. Ct.
1975) (voiding a curfew under strict scrutiny because the state failed to provide a compelling
government interest and the ordinance violated juveniles' fundamental right to travel); Allen v. City of
Bordentown, 524 A.2d 478, 486 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1987) (employing a form of strict scrutiny
review labelled the "compelling interest test," and invalidating a curfew as unconstitutionally vague,
overbroad, and a violation of equal protection rights); Milwaukee v. K.F., 426 N.W.2d 329, 339 (Wis.
1988) (upholding a curfew even under strict scrutiny analysis because the legislature drafted it "as
narrowly as practicable"). But see Federle, supra note 54, at 1351 (indicating that the Supreme Court
"has applied on 'intermediate-intermediate' level of scrutiny in those cases involving an infringement
of a minor's privacy rights and has requested the government to show only a 'significant state interest'
to justify the restriction"). See also Peter L. Scherr, Note, The Juvenile Curfew Ordinance: In Search
of a New Standard of Review, 41 WASH. U. J. UPm. & CONTEMP. L. 163, 191 (1993) (proposing that
the Supreme Court adopt an intermediate level of scrutiny requiring the government to demonstrate "an
important and unique interest in keeping children off the streets at night"). See supra note 20 to
compare the "strict scrutiny" test to these "intermediate level of scrutiny" tests.
60. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
61. See, e.g., In re Estate of Greenberg, 390 So. 2d 40, 42-43 (Fla. 1980) (noting that the strict
scrutiny test is "almost always" fatal in its application).
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curfew analysis.
B. Void for Vagueness
The vagueness doctrine is a common-law principle originating in
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process concerns of fair warning and
notice.62 A law is void for vagueness if it is so ambiguous that reasonable
people cannot distinguish permissible conduct from prohibited conduct. 3
The vagueness doctrine is premised on two distinct concerns.' Legisla-
tures must draft clear statutes, first, to ensure that the public is able to
understand and comply with the law and, second, to prevent arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement. 5
In Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown,66 the Middle District of
Pennsylvania upheld a curfew notwithstanding its determination that some
Middletown ordinance provisions were unconstitutionally vague.67 The
62. See Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926) (holding that a penal statute
was violative of due process because its terms were so vague that "men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at [their] meaning and differ as to [their] application").
63. See id.
64. See Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S.
104, 108-09 (1972). There are strict standing requirements for plaintiffs who file vagueness claims. See
City ofPanora v. Simmons, 445 N.W.2d 363, 366 (Iowa 1989) (holding that a juvenile lacked standing
to press vagueness attack against curfew ordinance where the challenged business establishment owner
exemptions did not apply to the minor's disputed violation); City of Milwaukee v. K.F., 426 N.W.2d
329, 333-34 (Wis. 1988) (finding liberal standing requirements for overbreadth claims but refusing to
similarly liberalize standing requirements for vagueness challenges). See also LAURENCE H. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-32, at 1036 (2d ed. 1988) ("Where the vice is vagueness, the
litigant asserting the vagueness defense must demonstrate that the statute in question is vague either in
all possible applications or at least as applied to the litigant's conduct, and not simply as applied to
some others.') (citing Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 753-58 (1974)). For examples of more liberal
standing requirements in "overbreadth" challenges, see supra note 88 and accompanying text.
Although some commentators lump overbreadth and vagueness together, see Susan M. Horowitz,
Note, A Search for Constitutional Standards: Judicial Review of Juvenile Curfew Ordinances, 24
COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 381, 400-02 (1991), the doctrines are not coextensive. See, e.g., In re Doe,
513 P.2d 1385 (Haw. 1973) (Richardson, J., dissenting) (noting that, although "[t]he terms 'vagueness'
and 'overbreadth' are often heard together," and vague statutes are "of necessity" overbroad, the
converse is not always true); K.F., 426 N.W.2d at 333 (noting that vagueness originates from procedural
due process, whereas overbreadth concerns originate from substantive due process); see also PAUL M.
BATOR ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM, 195-96 (3d
ed. 1988) (addressing the relationship between vagueness and overbreadth challenges). To compare the
vagueness challenge to the overbreadth challenge, see infra notes 85-98 and accompanying text.
65. Kolender, 461 U.S. at 357; Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108.
66. 401 F. Supp. 1242 (M.D. Pa. 1975).
67. Id. at 1249-53. The plaintiff challenged five different ordinance exemptions as containing
unconstitutionally vague language. Id. The court determined that phrases and terms such as "reasonable
necessity," "obstruct," "interfere," "remain," "necessary nighttime activities," and "normal travel"
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Bykofsky court relied on a severance clause68 to justify its decision and
required that the Middletown Council jettison the vague provisions before
resuming curfew enforcement.69 The court recognized that the precision
demanded by the plaintiffs would make drafting a constitutional curfew
ordinance, or any criminal statute "next to impossible.""
However, in In re Frank 0.,7 the California Court of Appeals invali-
dated a Long Beach curfew for vagueness.72 The challenged ordinance
failed to provide fair notice as to what constituted the proscribed conduct
of "loitering" and contained arbitrary standards for police enforcement.73
The court suggested that it might have upheld the ordinance if it had
constituted legally permissible standards. Id. (emphasis added). However, the court declared
unconstitutionally vague: "a minor well along the road to maturity," "normal... nighttime activity,"
and "consistent with the public interest." Id. (emphasis added). The court, in upholding the former
grouping, realized that some level of flexibility is necessary in laws of general application. Id. at 1253.
The court reasoned that the latter set conferred "almost unbridled discretion" upon the mayor and police
and based decision-making on their own "personal predilections and beliefs." Id. at 1250-5 1. The court's
reasoning, particularly its flip-flop on its interpretation of "normal," indicates that the vagueness
standard also lends itself to patently subjective jurisprudence. See also Allen v. City of Bordentown,
524 A.2d 478, 487 (N.J. Super. Cir. Law Div. 1987) (comparing Bykofsky and finding that the
Bordentown ordinance language, "reasonable judgement," was less exacting than the Middletown
ordinance language, "reasonable necessity," but ultimately concluding that both are "less instructive than
the law requires").
68. Middletown, Pa., Ordinance 662 (March 10, 1975), reprinted in Bykofsky, 401 F. Supp. at
1266-73. The ordinance states in relevant part:
Severability is intended throughout and within the provisions of the Curfew Ordinance. If any
provision, including inter alia any exception, part, phrase or term, or the application thereof
to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the application to other persons or circumstanc-
es shall not be affected thereby and the validity of the Curfew Ordinance in any and all other
respects shall not be affected thereby.
Middletown, Pa., Ordinance 662, § 9. Prudent curfew drafters include severance clauses hoping that,
as in Bykofsky, courts will still uphold ordinances even if they find portions unconstitutional. See, e.g.,
PHOENIX, ARiz., CODE § 22-1 (1993); Austin, Tex., Ordinance 900531-C (Apr. 9, 1992); Little Rock,
Ark., Ordinance 16,602 (Jan. 4, 1994); ORLANDO, FLA., CODE § 43-80 (1994); PHOENIX, AIZ., CODE
§ 22-1 (1993); San Antonio, Tex., Ordinance 76,419 (Sept. 3, 1992).
69. 401 F. Supp at 1252.
70. Id. at 1253.
71. 247 Cal. Rptr. 655 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988) (unofficially published by order of the California
Supreme Court).
72. Id.
73. Id. at 656-60 (citing Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972) (holding that
"[a]imless idle stops, pauses and purposeless distraction" are constitutionally protected activities, but
also recognizing In re Nancy C., 105 Cal. Rptr. 113 (Cal. Ct. App. 1972), and People v. Walton, 161
P.2d 498 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1945), which denied juveniles these rights during curfew hours
on the basis of the compelling state interests of juvenile protection and crime reduction).
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prohibited minors from lingering for the purposes of committing a crime7"
or, more plausibly, if the curfew had included reasonable exemptions.75
In striking the ordinance, the court refused to artificially clarify the
ordinance's manifestly ambiguous language.76
In sum, the vagueness doctrine itself can lead to manipulative and
capricious jurisprudence.77 Vagueness challenges permit judges to
arbitrarily label words "ambiguous" and substitute subjective interpretations
for objective analysis to fit their conclusions regarding curfew unconstitu-
tionality.78 Notwithstanding the subjectivity inherent in the vagueness
doctrine, plaintiffs will undoubtedly continue posing vagueness challenges.
Although no method of immunizing curfew ordinances from such attacks
exists, drafters can thwart many vagueness challenges through the use of
comprehensive and precise language, particularly in the definition section
of an ordinance. Indeed, some courts have invalidated curfews explicitly
because of definitional scarcity and inadequacy.79
74. Id. at 657. The court's first possible construction of the ordinance questions whether a criminal
ordinance can criminalize conduct solely on the basis of an individual's mental state. The answer to this
inquiry is beyond the scope of this Note. See generally, Jordan Berns, Comment, Is There Something
Suspicious About the Constitutionality of Loitering Laws?, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 717, 734 (1989)
(concluding that loitering laws often accurately predict future criminal conduct but necessarily raise
multiple constitutional and practical concerns); William Trosch, Comment, The Third Generation of
Loitering Laws Goes to Court: Do Laws that Criminalize "Loitering with the Intent to Sell Drugs" Pass
Constitutional Muster?, 71 N.C.L. REV. 513 (1993) (finding that loitering laws represent a clear
departure from well-established constitutional protection, which forbids arrests based solely on "mere
suspicion of future unlawful conduct" and an offender's mental state).
Still, curfews raise legitimate constitutional concerns because they criminalize a person's mere
presence. These concerns return to the core issue in curfew constitutionality, the difference between
adult and juvenile fundamental rights. See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 634 (1979) (concluding that
in some circumstances adults and juveniles do not share coextensive fundamental rights).
75. Frank 0., 247 Cal. Rptr. at 657. Courts have repeatedly emphasized that legislatures who
meticulously draft curfews with exacting exemptions significantly increase the likelihood of the
ordinance withstanding constitutional scrutiny. See, e.g., Qutb v. Strauss, I 1 F.3d 488, 493-94 (5th Cir.
1993) (upholding the Dallas ordinance under strict scrutiny and noting that "the defenses are the most
important consideration in determining whether [the] ordinance is narrowly tailored").
76. 247 Cal. Rptr. at 657. Considering the brevity of the ordinance and its complete dearth of
exemptions, it is not surprising that the court invalidated the curfew:
No person under the age of eighteen years shall loiter about any public place ... between the
hours of ten p.m. and the time of sunrise of the following day when not accompanied by his
parent or legal guardian having legal custody and control of such person, or spouse of such
person over twenty-one years of age.
Id. at 656-57 (citing Long Beach, Cal., Ordinance C-5738 § 1 (1983)).
77. See supra note 67.
78. See supra note 67.
79. See Ashton v. Brown, 660 A.2d 447, 456-58 (Md. 1995) (invalidating a curfew because the
legislature failed to establish a "commonly and generally accepted meaning" or "clear standard" for
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C. First Amendment Attacks
Plaintiffs often pose First Amendment" attacks as freedom of associa-
tion violations. Courts have adopted differing positions on whether
juveniles and adults possess equal rights of freedom of association.8
There are two distinct types of First Amendment challenges to curfews: 2




The overbreadth doctrine 5 focuses on the constitutional limitations on
statutes that proscribe certain types of conduct.8 6 The core inquiry is
whether a plaintiff may challenge a law that legitimately prohibits some
conduct, but unconstitutionally infringes upon other protected conduct.8
what constitutes a "bona fide organization"); Allen v. City of Bordentown, 524 A.2d 478,481-82 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Law Div. 1987) (striking down a curfew in part because the legislature failed to define terms
such as "facilities," "disturbance or annoyance," "free passage," or "legitimate business").
80. The First Amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press,
or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
81. See, ag., Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969)
(discussing First Amendment rights and declaring that high school students possess "fundamental rights
that the [s]tate must respect"); Id. at 515 (Stewart, J., concurring) (finding that children are not
"possessed of that full capacity for individual choice which is the presupposition of First Amendment
guarantees') (citing Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 649-50 (1968) (Stewart, J., concurring)),
82. Although overbreadth claims are not exclusively limited to First Amendment challenges, an
overwhelming number of courts determining curfew constitutionality evaluate overbreadth in this
context. See infra notes 85-98 and accompanying text.
83. See infra notes 85-98 and accompanying text. Overbreadth is a Supreme Court created
common-law doctrine that originated over fifty years ago. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Making Sense of
Overbreadth, 100 YALE L.J. 853, 863 (1991) (citing Thomhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 105 (1940)).
84. See infra notes 99-114 and accompanying text.
85. The overbreadth doctrine is often misconstrued by courts .and critics, and confusingly
intertwined with vagueness challenges. See supra note 59. However, the doctrines are distinct. It is quite
possible for a statute to contain exacting language and still sweep beyond constitutional limits. See, e.g.,
TRIBE, supra note 64, at 1033 (stating that "[v]agueness is a constitutional vice conceptually distinct
from overbreadth in that an overbroad law need lack neither clarity nor precision and a vague law need
not reach activity protected by the [F]irst Amendment").
86. See, e.g., Trosch, supra note 74, at 535-44 (analyzing the overbreadth doctrine as it applies
to ordinances prohibiting "loitering with intent to sell drugs"); see generally, Fallon, supra note 83
(comprehensively examining the development and application of the overbreadth doctrine).
87. Trosch, supra note 74, at 535; Fallon, supra note 83, at 858-59. In effect, an overbreadth
challenge is a claim that, even though the statute in question may legitimately bar the conduct of the
accused, it impermissibly prohibits constitutionally protected activities of persons not presently before
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To establish standing for an overbreadth challenge a plaintiff must: first,
have violated the ordinance, and second, show that the statute, applied
according to its terms, would violate the rights of persons not presently
before the court, even though it may be constitutional as applied to the
plaintiff."5
In addition to the standing requirements, the plaintiff must also prove
that the court cannot narrowly construe the statute in efforts to revive its
constitutional validity. 9 Finally, the plaintiff must prove that the curfew's
"deterrent effect" on constitutionally protected conduct is both "real" and
"substantial.""0
the court, and accordingly must be invalidated. Thus, it is a standing rule providing for the protection
of the constitutional rights of individuals affected by the law suit who otherwise would never have had
"the opportunity to air [their] constitutional claims." Trosch, supra note 74, at 535; Fallon, supra note
83, at 858-59.
88. See Waters v. Barry, 711 F. Supp. 1125, 1132 (D.D.C. 1989) (finding plaintiffs challenging
a curfew ordinance to lack standing to file an overbreadth claim because "the challenged statute would
have no greater impact upon the rights of nonparties than it would have upon the rights of the parties
before the court," and instead interpreting plaintiffs' claim to be a direct facial challenge to the
ordinance's constitutional validity). For further discussion of Waters, see infra notes 101-06 and
accompanying text. For discussion of "traditional facial invalidity," see infra notes 99-114 and
accompanying text. The Waters court also criticized other courts' analyses of the overbreadth doctrine
as applied to other juvenile curfew ordinances. Waters, 711 F. Supp. at 1133 n.15 (criticizing Johnson
v. City of Opelousas, 658 F.2d 1065 (5th Cir. 1981); MeCollester v. City of Keene, 586 F. Supp. 1381
(D.N.H. 1984); Ruffv. Marshall, 438 F. Supp. 303 (M.D. Ga. 1974); Allen v. City of Bordentown, 524
A.2d 478 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1987)). For a discussion of the chilling effect of overbroad
ordinances, see Trosch, supra note 74, at 535-36 (citing U.S. v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 21 (1960)).
89. See Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205,216 (1975). Fallon warns that overbreadth
is a weaker doctrine than many critics appreciate. Fallon, supra note 83, at 853-55. Because of the
"coordinate" relationship of state courts and lower federal courts, state civil and criminal actions may
continue under a law previously ruled overbroad by a lower federal court. Id. at 853-54. And even the
Supreme Court lacks the authority to delete a state statute, or to prohibit a state court from more
narrowly construing the statute. Id. at 854-55. Thus, under Fallon's interpretation, it seems that if federal
courts invalidate curfews on overbreadth grounds, state prosecutors may still pursue all non-parties in
a state court. See id. at 854. Of course, the state is bound by issue and claim preclusion with regard to
the parties in the federal suit. Plaintiffs have attempted to avoid these limitations of the overbreadth
doctrine by filing class action suits. See, e.g., Opelousas, 658 F.2d at 1069 (noting that the lower court,
in erroneously denying class certification, had believed a class action to be "unnecessary" because "any
relief obtained by [plaintiffs] would inure to the benefit of all similarly situated minors"). However,
filing a class action precludes an overbreadth challenge because it renders the second standing
requirement inapplicable. See Waters, 711 F. Supp. at 1133; see also supra note 88 and accompanying
text; intfra note 103 and accompanying text.
90. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973). Although the First Amendment protects
both free speech and free expression, the Broadrick Court made a distinction between statutes regulating
speech and regulating conduct. Id. at 612-15. As to pure speech, the Court found that under the
traditional overbreadth doctrine it could invalidate the entire statute if the ordinance "chilled" or
intimidated non-party free speech. Id. However, with regards to conduct, the Court limited the doctrine
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In the curfew context, the overbreadth challenge typically hinges upon
whether there are too few exceptions in the ordinance, thereby unconstitu-
tionally infringing upon the rights of juveniles.9" Although courts tradi-
tionally limit the overbreadth doctrine to First Amendment protections,92
courts have allowed overbreadth claims against curfew ordinances under the
rights of travel and movement.9"
In Johnson v. City of Opelousas,94 the Fifth Circuit invalidated a
juvenile curfew ordinance because its overbroad restrictions infringed upon
the rights of Opelousas minors to associate and travel freely.9" The court
determined that, although juvenile and adult First Amendment rights are not
coextensive, minors still enjoy a "significant measure" of fundamental
association rights.96 The court concluded that the Opelousas curfew was
overbroad because the "absence of exemptions" stifled "legitimate
activities" and "preclude[d] a narrowing construction."'97 In dicta, however,
the Fifth Circuit left unresolved whether a narrowly drawn curfew
ordinance could withstand constitutional scrutiny.9"
to statutes where overbreadth is "not only... real, but substantial as well, judged in relation to the
statute's plainly legitimate sweep." Id. at 615.
91. See, e.g., Johnson v. City of Opelousas, 658 F.2d 1065, 1074 (5th Cir. 1981).
92. Specifically, courts limit overbreadth to freedoms of speech, expression, and association. See
People v. J.M., 768 P.2d 219, 224-25 (1989) (upholding a curfew and noting that the plaintiff failed
to meet First Amendment overbreadth standing requirements).
93. See, e.g., McCollester v. City of Keene, 586 F. Supp. 1381, 1384 (D.N.H. 1984) (quoting
Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 164 (1972)) (noting that although neither the
Constitution nor the Bill of Rights explicitly created the right of intrastate travel, rather it is a
fundamental "part of the amenities of life"); Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown, 401 F. Supp. 1242,
1254-55 (M.D. Pa. 1975) (elucidating that the right to movement finds broad protection under the
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause). See generally supra notes 115-50 and accompanying text.
94. 658 F.2d 1065 (5th Cir. 1981). In Opelousas, a small rural town in western Louisiana, police
detained a local juvenile during curfew hours. Id at 1067. The juvenile and his mother filed a claim
based on violations of: 1) vagueness, 2) overbreadth, 3) freedoms of speech, association, assembly, and
religion, 4) freedom of movement, 5) freedom of interstate travel, and 6) fundamental parenting rights.
Id. at 1068. However, the court expressly limited its holding to the overbreadth issue. Id. at 1074.
95. Id. at 1073 n.8.
96. Id. at 1072.
97. Id. at 1071, 1074. The court referred to one of their earlier decisions, which invalidated as
overbroad a municipal ordinance that forbade operators of pinball parlors from allowing juveniles in
their establishment without a parent or adult. Id. at 1071 & n.8 (citing Aladdin's Castle, Inc. v.
Mesquite, 630 F.2d 1029 (5th Cir. 1980)). The court noted the Opelousas ordinance was even broader
than that invalidated in Aladdin's Castle because it prohibited juvenile presence in any public area. Id.
at 1071 n.8.
98. Id. at 1074. At least one commentator inferred that the Opelousas court also would have
invalidated a more narrowly drawn curfew ordinance (essentially taking the position that curfew
ordinances are inherently unconstitutional). See Paul M. Cahill, Note, Nonemergency Municipal Curfew
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2. Traditional Facial Invalidity
In traditional facial invalidity challenges under the First Amendment, the
plaintiff asserts that the statute is unconstitutional as applied to her.99
Thus, unlike overbreadth claims, a plaintiff must prove that the statute
directly abridged her own First Amendment rights; its impact on others is
irrelevant."°° Further, unlike overbreadth, a plaintiff can file a class action
suit.
In Waters v. Barry,' the plaintiffs filed a class action suit and
challenged a District of Columbia curfew ordinance as overbroad on First
and Fifth Amendment grounds. 2 The court declined to grant the plain-
tiffs standing to pursue an overbreadth claim because a class action suit
necessarily includes everyone who could be affected by the litigation. 3
Instead, the court liberally interpreted the plaintiffs' claim as a direct facial
challenge to the ordinance's constitutionality."° Because the ordinance
put all juveniles under "virtual house arrest," without any differentiation
between mischievous or innocent nocturnal activities, the court held that it
"trample[d] upon" the First Amendment associational rights and the Fifth
Amendment liberty rights of the plaintiffs. 5 The court reasoned that it
Ordinances and the Liberty Interests of Minors, 12 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 513, 538-39. However, in light
of the Qutb decision upholding a "more narrowly drawn" ordinance, see supra notes 14-25 and
accompanying text, the views of this commentator appear misplaced.
99. See, e.g., Waters v. Barry, 711 F. Supp. 1125, 1133 (D.D.C. 1989) (rejecting the plaintiff's
overbreadth challenge and instead facially invalidating a D.C. curfew under the First Amendment
because the "plaintiff class has been certified which... includes everyone who might be affected by
the Act." Thus, overbreadth is actually a subset of facial invalidity; one that generally provides more
lenient standing requirements. See supra note 87. However, overbreadth is discussed separately because
of its commonality in challenges to the constitutionality of curfew ordinances.
100. See supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text.
101. 711 F. Supp. 1125 (D.D.C. 1989).
102. Id. at 1132.
103. Id. at 1133. The court stated that "when the challenged statute would have no greater impact
upon the rights of non-parties than it would have upon the rights of the parties before the [c]ourt-there
is no need to employ a traditional overbreadth analysis." Id.
104. Id. at 1134. The plaintiffs never filed a traditional facial invalidity challenge under the First
or Fifth Amendments. See id. at 1132. While the court dismissed the overbreadth portion of the claim,
it accepted the claim as a traditional First Amendment challenge. Id. at 1134. Ostensibly, the Waters
court replaced the plaintiffs' stated claim with that most appropriate to their allegations and the facts
of the case.
105. Id. at 1134. Surprisingly and probably erroneously, in light of the Supreme Court's statements
on the right of movement, the D.C. district court categorized the right of movement as "rooted in the
First Amendment's protection of expression and association." Id. (citing Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S.
19 (1989) (upholding a Dallas ordinance restricting juveniles from admission to dance clubs)). In Dallas
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was impossible to segregate permissible from impermissible applications of
the curfew and concluded that the District of Columbia could not
constitutionally apply the ordinance. 1 6
In Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown,0 7 the court upheld the
Middletown curfew ordinance in the face of freedom of speech, freedom
of association, and freedom of assembly challenges.0 8 The court relied
on an ordinance exemption that allowed juveniles to exercise their First
Amendment rights during curfew hours if they obtained parental permis-
sion, if practicable, and provided written notice to the municipal govern-
ment. 10 9 The court determined that the "fairly administered notice
provision" only negligibly affected the First Amendment rights ofjuveniles,
restricting the time and place of their exercise of such rights, not the
content." Moreover, the negligible impact was outweighed by the
Borough's "legitimate interest in the reasonable control of its streets. " 1'
In response to the plaintiffs free speech argument, the court concluded that
any infringement on speech was merely incidental to the curfew's actual
purpose, regulating conduct, a right less deserving of protection than pure
speech."
12
In sum, courts have interpreted the First Amendment in divergent
fashions. Ostensibly, some courts, like the Waters court, broadly interpret
v. Stanglin, the Supreme Court refused to extend First Amendment rights to the freedom of movement
and to cover a "generalized right of association." Id. at 24-25. The court stated, "it is possible to find
some kernel of expression in almost every activity a person undertakes ... but such a kernel is not
sufficient to bring the activity within the protection of the First Amendment." Id. at 25.
106. Id. at 1133-36.
107. 401 F. Supp. 1242 (M.D. Pa. 1975).
108. Id. at 1258-61.
109. Id. at 1258. The court cited, among others, Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 574-76
(1941), and Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395, 405 (1953), in support of the sufficiency of the
notice exemption. Id. at 1258-59. The Bykofsky court noted that in Cox, the Supreme Court "upheld the
constitutionality of a statute [that] prohibited parades without a special license, an enactment.., more
restrictive than the mere notice provisions of the curfew ordinance in [the instant case]." Id. In Poulos,
the Court upheld an ordinance requiring persons to obtain a permit before participating in a religious
meeting in a public park. 345 U.S. 395. The Poulos Court further stated that the First Amendment
permits "reasonable nondiscriminatory regulation by governmental authority that preserves peace, order
and tranquility without deprivation of the First Amendment guarantees of free speech, press and the
exercise of religion." Id. at 405.
110. Bykofsky, 401 F. Supp. at 1258.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 1260-61 (citing U.S. v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367,376-77 (1968)). In O'Brien, the Supreme
Court determined that when speech and non-speech elements inextricably overlap in the same course
of conduct, a compelling government interest in regulating the non-speech element outweighs the
incidental infringement on First Amendment protection. 391 U.S. at 376.
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the First Amendment so as to preclude any juvenile curfew from surviving
First Amendment scrutiny. 13 However, most courts adopt a narrower
view."' To increase the chances of viability in these courts, legislators
must draft exemptions that maintain an equilibrium between impermissibly
violating First Amendment rights and eviscerating the curfew.
D. Right of Movement: Interstate and Intrastate Travel
Another frequently asserted constitutional challenge to curfew ordinances
is the right of movement.1 5 In Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville,"6
the Supreme Court firmly established this right as "historically part of the
amenities of life" but did not explicitly declare it to be a fundamental
right. 17 In Kent v. Dulles,"' the Court later elucidated freedom of
movement to be "basic in our scheme of values" and "part of the 'liberty'
of which the citizen cannot be deprived without due process of law."" 9
Courts have divided the right of movement into rights of interstate and
intrastate travel. 2 Typically, courts recognize the former as a fundamen-
tal right,' and accord the latter less protection.'22
1. Interstate Travel
Courts have repeatedly recognized that citizens enjoy a fundamental right
113. Waters v. Barry, 711 F. Supp. 1125 (D.D.C. 1989).
114. See, e.g., Qutb v. Strauss, 11 F.3d 488, 495 (5th Cir. 1993) (questioning whether a
fundamental right to association even exists); In re J.M., 768 P.2d 219, 224 (Colo. 1989) (finding that
the curfew "regulates conduct and does not prevent minors from exercising their First Amendment
rights"); City of Milwaukee v. K.F., 426 N.W.2d 329, 338 (Wis. 1988) (finding that the curfew did not
violate the First Amendment because juvenile fundamental rights are not "automatically coextensive
with the rights of adults").
115. See Johnson v. City of Opelousas, 658 F.2d 1065, 1072 (5th Cir. 1981); McCollester v. City
of Keene, 586 F. Supp. 1381, 1384-85 (D.N.H. 1984); Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown, 401 F.
Supp. 1242, 1261 (M.D. Pa. 1975); In re Nancy C., 105 Cal. Rptr. 113, 118 (Cal. Ct. App. 1972); In
re J.M., 768 P.2d 219, 221-23 (Colo. 1989); City of Panora v. Simmons, 445 N.W.2d 363, 366-69
(Iowa 1989).
116. 405 U.S. 156 (1972).
117. Id. at 164.
118. 357 U.S. 116 (1958).
119. Id. at 125-26 (1958). The Court references the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
However, its statement is presumably equally applicable to the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
120. See infra notes 123-50 and accompanying text.
121. See infra notes 123-36 and accompanying text.
122. See infra notes 137-50 and accompanying text.
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to interstate travel. The textual basis for this right is unclear' but
traditionally courts have relied on the Privileges and Immunities claus-
es, 124 and the Commerce Clause to justify its existence.,25 For instance,
in Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 26 the Supreme Court held a federal
statute unconstitutional because it barred a member of the Communist party
from making an application for or using a passport. 27 The Court rea-
soned that the provision "too broadly and indiscriminately restricts the right
to travel and thereby abridges the liberty guaranteed by the Fifth Amend-
ment.' 28 Four years later, in Shapiro v. Thompson,19 the Court reiter-
ated that the right to travel interstate is a fundamental right and invalidated
a District of Columbia statutory provision that required welfare recipients
to reside in D.C. for an entire year immediately before applying for bene-
fits.130
In interpreting curfews, courts have recognized that the scope of
juveniles' fundamental right of interstate travel does not equal that of
adults.' Nonetheless, such courts have held curfews to unconstitutionally
infringe upon juveniles' rights to travel interstate.'3 2 Courts upholding
curfews have also highlighted exemptions permitting interstate travel during
curfew hours. 33  In Bykofsky, 134 the court noted that the ordinance
123. See City of Panora v. Simmons, 445 N.W.2d 363, 367 (Iowa 1989) (citing TRIBi, supra note
64, § 16-8, at 1455 n.3); see also Horowitz, supra note 64, at 387-88 (noting that the Supreme Court
has not "[found] it necessary to attribute the right of travel to any particular constitutional provision')
(citing Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 630-31 (1969); Attorney General of New York v. Soto-
Lopez, 476 U.S. 898, 902 (1986)).
124. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1; id. at amend. XIV, § 1.
125. See TRIBE, supra note 64, § 16-8, at 1455 n.3; Horowitz, supra note 64, at 385-88.
126. 378 U.S. 500 (1964).
127. Id. at 506.
128. Id. at 505. See also Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 269-70 (1974)
(holding that an Arizona statute, requiring residency for a year as a condition for receiving non-
emergency medicare, created an "invidious classification" and thus infringed upon the right of interstate
travel "by denying newcomers 'basic necessities of life."); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 338
(1972) (holding that durational residence laws unconstitutionally restrict the right of free travel).
129. 394 U.S. 618, 622, 630-31 (1969). The Court stated that "the nature of our Federal Union and
our constitutional concepts of personal liberty unite to require that all citizens be free to travel
throughout the length and breadth of our land uninhibited by statutes, rules, or regulations which
unreasonably burden or restrict this movement." Id. at 629.
130. Id.
131. See, e.g., Johnson v. City of Opelousas, 658 F.2d 1065, 1072 (5th Cir. 1981); McCollester v.
City of Keene, 586 F. Supp. 1381, 1384-85 (D.N.H. 1984).
132. See, e.g., McCollester, 586 F. Supp. at 1384-85 (invalidating a municipal curfew ordinance
because "with the exception of employment travel, [it] prohibits the entire spectrum of unchaperoned
juvenile activity, ranging from delinquent to heroic').
133. See Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown, 401 F. Supp. 1242, 1261 (M.D. Pa. 1975).
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exempted juveniles engaged in interstate travel from the curfew's
scope. 3' Therefore, the court concluded, the ordinance did not infringe
on the fundamental right to interstate travel.
13 6
2. Intrastate Travel
Like interstate travel, the right to travel intrastate is a fundamental
right. 37 The Supreme Court recognized the fundamental right to intrastate
travel in the 1920 case of United States v. Wheeler.1 31 In Wheeler, the
Court established that citizens have a fundamental right to move freely
from place to place and enjoy "free ingress thereto and egress there-
from."' 139 Fifty years later, in Papachristou v. Jacksonville,4 ' the Court
invalidated a vagrancy statute' that prohibited loitering in public, noting
that the freedom of movement permits one to exercise this right even if
aimlessly wandering and loitering.
142
In many curfew cases, courts have recognized that adults enjoy a
fundamental right to travel intrastate; 43 however, unlike interstate rights,
that recognition does not uniformly extend to juveniles.1" For example,
134. Id.
135. Id. at 1261.
136. Id.
137. United States v. wheeler, 254 U.S. 281, 293 (1920).
138. Id.
139. Id. at 293.
140. 405 U.S. 156 (1972).
141. Id. at 156-58 n.l. For an argument that Papachristou recognizes a constitutional "right to
loiter," see Trosch, supra note 74, at 551. Trosch's article argues that contemporary statutes that
criminalize "loitering with intent to sell drugs" are unconstitutional in light of the constitutional rights
recognized in Papachristou. Id. at 513-15, 551.
142. Id. at 164.
143. See Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown, 401 F. Supp. 1242, 1254-55 (M.D. Pa. 1975); In
re J.M. 768 P.2d 219, 221 (Colo. 1989); City of Panora v. Simmons, 445 N.W.2d 363, 367 (Iowa
1989).
144. See Bykofsky, 401 F. Supp. at 1256 (distinguishing juveniles' right to intrastate travel from
adults' rights because the "interest of minors.., is not nearly so important to the social, economic, and
healthful well-being of the community as the free movement of adults"); J.M., 768 P.2d at 221-23
(concluding that a juvenile's liberty interest in "being on the streets after 10:00 o'clock" is not a
fundamental right); Simmons, 445 N.W.2d at 366-69 (concluding that minors' right of intracity travel
is not a fundamental right).
Both In reJ.M and Panora rely on Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 168-70 (1944) to support
the argument that the government may constitutionally restrain juveniles' freedom of intrastate
movement. In Prince, the Supreme Court allowed the state of Massachusetts to restrict a minor's right
to use the streets to sell religious magazines. 321 U.S. at 170. The Court reasoned:
The state's authority over children's activities is broader than over like actions of adults.
This is particularly true of public activities and in matters of employment ....
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in In re J.M, 145 the Supreme Court of Colorado upheld a municipal
curfew and determined that juveniles' liberty interests in the freedom of
intrastate movement did not constitute a fundamental right. 46 Similarly,
in Panora v. Simmons, 47 the Iowa Supreme Court concluded that the
fundamental right of intrastate movement did not extend to juveniles. 48
Accordingly, the court applied the rational relationship test, and upheld the
Panora curfew as constitutional. 49
In synthesizing the preceding cases, no clear standard emerges for
interpreting curfew restrictions on interstate and intrastate travel. Ostensi-
bly, courts would have trouble overturning an ordinance that exempted
interstate travel from curfew restrictions. However, inclusion of such an
exemption in ordinances in municipalities that rest on state borders could
lead to curfew circumvention.' Furthermore, a similar exemption for
intrastate travel would render a curfew meaningless. Thus, although there
is no easy solution, effective curfews must include movement exemptions
that strike a balance between constitutionality and permitting juveniles to
freely roam the streets in crime-ridden areas.
IV. ANALYSIS OF QUTB V. STRAUSS
The Fifth Circuit's decision in Qutb prompted many legislatures to draft
ordinances modeled after the Dallas ordinance.'' Undoubtedly, the Dallas
ordinance is an improvement upon many of its draconian predecessors. 52
However, curfew proponents should not delightfully conclude that the
Dallas curfew is a constitutional cure-all. This is particularly true consider-
ing the Fifth Circuit's charitable treatment and cursory analysis of the
It is true children have rights in common with older people, in the primary use of
highways. But even in such use streets afford dangers for them not affecting adults.. . . What
may be wholly permissible for adults therefore may not be so for children, either with or
without their parents' presence.
Id. at 168-70.
145. 768 P.2d 219 (Colo. 1989).
146. Id. at 223.
147. 445 N.W.2d 363, 369 (Iowa 1989).
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. For example, in Washington, D.C., where the city council adopted an ordinance modeled on
the Dallas curfew, juveniles residing in the Northern Virginia or Maryland suburbs can drive into the
Capital. See Washington, D.C., Juvenile Curfew Amendment Act of 1995 (to be codified at D.C. CODE
ANN. § 11-48 (1996)). If police stop their vehicle, juveniles need only tell the officer that they were
traveling home to exempt themselves from the curfew. Id.
151. See supra note 150.
152. For an example of such an ordinance, see notes 71-76 and accompanying text.
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Dallas curfew.
The most glaring shortcoming is the court's perfunctory treatment of the
ordinance provision that exempts any juvenile exercising conduct protected
by the First Amendment."5 3 The court praises it as the most notable
exemption but fails to state how Dallas will apply the exception.
15 4
Interpreting the exemption language plainly would cause curfew enforce-
ment to lapse into inane futility. Any juvenile exercising any form of
expression, religious observance, association, or assembly would be exempt
from curfew prohibitions.
Additionally, even though the court applied the strict scrutiny test,
usually the most rigorous standard, the court did not require the city to
produce precise data regarding the number of juvenile violations and
victimizations during curfew hours. Basing its decision on Supreme Court
precedent, the court refused to demand "scientifically certain criteria."'
155
Furthermore, the Qutb court did not scrutinize the questionable clarity of
the enforcement standards. The Dallas ordinance merely states that an
"officer shall not issue a citation or make an arrest... unless the officer
reasonably believes that an offense has occurred."' 56 In response to a
vagueness challenge, less forgiving courts could invalidate the ordinance
because the reasonable belief standard does not allow reasonable persons
to distinguish permissible from prohibited conduct.'57
V. PROPOSALS
In light of the inherent constitutional infirmities of curfew ordinances'
and a recent decision invalidating a curfew loosely modeled after the Dallas
ordinance,' 59 legislators should examine ways to further shield Qutb-like
curfews from constitutional attack while retaining sufficient impact to deter
crime.
153. See Appendix, infra, § (c)(1)(H).
154. Qutb, 11 F.3d 488, 494 (5th Cir. 1993).
155. Id. at 493 & n.7 (citing Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 642 (1968)). The court merely
required that the city "demonstrate that the classification created by the ordinance 'fits' the state's
compelling interest." Id. at 493.
156. See Appendix, infra.
157. See supra notes 62-65 and accompanying text for a discussion of the vagueness standards. See
also infra notes 163-65 and accompanying text for a possible defense to a vagueness challenge.
158. See supra notes 48-154 and accompanying text.
159. Pred v. Dade County, No. 94-03203-CA-21 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Sept. 21, 1994) (invalidating a
curfew as violative of the Florida Constitution). For a more complete discussion of Pred, see supra note
39.
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First, drafters should include a provision implementing an identification
card program. Critics have argued that curfews impermissibly burden
youthful appearing adults because police frequently stop and question these
individuals, believing that they are juveniles in violation of their cur-
few. 6 An identification card program would give juveniles the option of
obtaining a photo I.D. before or after their seventeenth birthday.'6
Undeniably, the program would produce financial burdens. 62 However,
if drafters adopted a permissive standard, i.e., giving juveniles the option
of obtaining an I.D., it would mitigate costs and increase efficiency. Those
juveniles who believe they appear old enough or find police questioning
tolerable could forego obtaining an identification card. Additionally, police
could avoid useless inquiries with persons outside the scope of the curfew.
Similarly, drafters should consider modifying the First Amendment
exception by inserting a Bykofsky-modeled "permit plan."' 63 Notwith-
160. See Michigan v. Smith, 276 N.W.2d 471 (Mich. Ct. App. 1979) (holding curfew ordinance not
to "impinge on freedom of movement of youthful looking persons over age of 18").
161. Clearly, in many instances driver's licenses would preclude the need for an identification card
program. However, for juveniles above sixteen that do not acquire driver's licenses, the identification
card program provides a free opportunity to forestall unnecessary inquiries by police.
162. As stated at the beginning of this Note, and implicit throughout, if a municipality desires
effective and constitutional curfew ordinances, it must be willing to accept concomitant financial
burdens.
163. Middletown, Pa., Ordinance 662 (March 10, 1975), reprinted in Bykofsky v. Borough of
Middletown, 401 F. Supp. 1242, 1269-70 (M.D. Pa. 1975). The permit provisions, § 5(g), referencing
individual juveniles, and § 5(h), referencing groups ofjuveniles, state in relevant part:
(g) When authorized, by special permit from the Mayor, carried on the person of the minor
thus authorized, as follows. when necessary nighttime activities of a minor ... may be
inadequately provided for by other provisions of this ordinance, then recourse may be had to
the Mayor... for a special permit as the circumstances warrant [or]
(h) [issuing a group permit) to more minors than can readily be dealt with on an individual
special permit basis ... [The permit] should be issued sufficiently in advance ... and shall
define the activity, the scope of the use of the streets permitted, the period of time involved
... and the reason for finding that such regulation is reasonably necessary ....
Id. Section 5(g) also requires that the permit include the minor's and parent's names, addresses, and
telephone numbers, and the minor's height, weight, sex, eye and hair color. Id.
Drafters should select precise language to create a permit provision because the Bykofsky court
severed vague language from Middletown's original permit provision. Id. at 1251. Furthermore, permit
provision drafters should recognize that the Bykofsky court upheld the plaintiff's First Amendment
challenge under the Middletown curfew's "notice" requirement not under the "permit plan." Id. at 1258.
The notice provision exempts juveniles that submitted written notice, with the juvenile's and, if
"practicable," parents' signatures, to a city official prior to exercising First Amendment rights. Id. The
notice provision differs from the permit plan because it does not require administrative pre-approval,
the juvenile need only submit notice. Id. Thus, the notice requirement appears to have limited utility
because without any authoritative review of submitted notices, as in the permit plan, juveniles could
frequently utilize the notice provisions to circumvent the curfew.
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standing other ordinance exemptions, the plan would allow juveniles to
engage in activities protected by the First Amendment during curfew hours
only if they first obtain a permit approved by a state administrative
authority."6 Under the Dallas ordinance, a juvenile falls under its First
Amendment exemption merely by exercising "First Amendment rights
protected by the United States Constitution."1 65 Although, some critics
have condemned permit proposals as unduly burdening constitutionally
protected activities,"' some form of limitation on juvenile exercises of
First Amendment rights is essential to prevent curfew futility, which would
assuredly result from inclusion of an unqualified First Amendment
exemption. A Bykofsky modeled permit plan would effectively straddle the
line between unconstitutionality and curfew futility.
Legislators should also consider modifying the language establishing the
ordinance enforcement standard from "reasonable belief "67 to "probable
cause." The inherent ambiguity in the reasonable belief standard unneces-
sarily invites vagueness attacks."6 ' Substitution of the uniform and
recognized probable cause standard, buttressed with an explicit defini-
tion,169 would legitimize the standard and give clear guidelines to
juveniles, law enforcement officials, and judges alike.
Similarly, the ordinance's enforcement section should distinguish
between probable cause to arrest and the less definite standard requiring
officers to stop and question persons who are apparently juveniles violating
the curfew. Some courts have differentiated between these standards and
determined that even if an officer lacks probable cause to arrest an
individual, the officer may detain and question that person to determine
whether probable cause exists. 7 The Supreme Court, however, noted in
164. See supra note 162.
165. See Appendix, infra, § (c)(l)(H).
166. See Martin P. Hogan, Casenote, Waters v. Barry: Juvenile Curfews-The D.C. Council's
"Quick Fix"for the Drug Crisis, 1 GEo. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 313, 323-26 (1990) (concluding that prior
registration or permit requirements unconstitutionally infringe upon protected rights).
167. See Appendix, infra, § (d).
168. See supra notes 62-79 and accompanying text.
169. "Probable cause" is defined as:
Reasonable cause; having more evidence for than against. A reasonable ground for belief in
certain alleged facts. A set of probabilities grounded in the factual and practical considerations
which govern the decisions of reasonable and prudent persons and is more than mere
suspicion but less than the quantum of evidence required for conviction.
BLACK'S LAW DIcTIONARY 1201 (6th ed. 1990).
170. See In re Nancy C., 105 Cal. Rptr. 113, 117 (Cal. Ct. App. 1972) (stating that a police officer
may stop and question a person and "[i]f the investigation reveals probable cause, then the officer may
arrest the suspect and conduct a reasonable search"); Michigan v. Smith, 276 N.W.2d 481, 484 (Mich.
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Terry v. Ohio that an individual is not required to answer questions in an
investigatory stop and that failure to answer questions alone does not
provide an officer with probable cause to arrest the individual.,' Still,
Terry does not preclude a curfew arrest if an officer otherwise establishes
probable cause that the detainee is a juvenile violating the curfew.'72
Additionally, municipalities173 that particularly fear challenges to the
ordinance based on Equal Protection grounds, 74 should mandate' that
police officers question any apparent"' curfew violator. Currently, under
the Dallas curfew, enforcement is not mandatory.'77 A mandatory
enforcement requirement would forestall claims of arbitrary or discriminato-
ry enforcement because police officers could not selectively choose which
juveniles to stop and question. Of course, this too is a trade-off between
constitutional surety and curfew practicality. Such a requirement would
strain financial and human resources and possibly reduce police and
community support.
Another option, although one that could reduce the overall effectiveness
of the curfew is to limit curfews to specific geographic areas.'78 A few
Ct. App. 1979) (finding that probable cause to arrest is not necessary for an investigatory stop),
171. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 34 (1968) (white, J., concurring).
172. See, e.g., Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983). In Kolender, Justice Brennan indicated
that "in some circumstances it is even conceivable that the mere fact that a suspect refuses to answer
questions... viewed in the context of the facts that gave rise to reasonable suspicion in the first place,
would be enough to provide probable cause." Id. at 366 n.4. Thus, under Kolender, a police officer
establishes reasonable suspicion when he or she observes an individual during curfew hours who
appears sixteen or under, and establishes probable cause when the purported juvenile refuses to answer
the officer's questions.
173. The provision should be included in curfews in municipalities with large minority populations
or minority populations concentrated in high crime areas.
174. Knowledgeable parties have stated their fear that curfews could be enforced in a discriminatory
fashion. See Hirth, supra note 5, at A2 (quoting Bruce Winick, University of Miami Law Professor);
Potok, supra note 1, at A3 (The ACLU argues curfews can be enforced primarily against inner-city
youth, mainly minorities). See also Chase v. Twist, 323 F. Supp. 749 (E.D. Ark. 1970) (upholding a
curfew and rejecting the African-American plaintiffs' claim that discriminatory police enforcement
violated their Fourteenth Amendment equal protection rights).
175. The author realizes that mandatory requirements would, understandably, face serious
opposition. Police resources would undoubtedly be strained. Nonetheless, this drawback must be
weighed against the possibility of the curfew being held to violate the Equal Protection Clause. See
supra note 174.
176. Obviously, if a juvenile falls within a curfew exemption by, for example, accompanying a
parent or playing on his or her front steps, a police officer should not stop and question the juvenile.
177. See Appendix, infra.
178. For example, the Qutb court explicitly noted that it could "envision the constitutionality of a
narrowly drawn nocturnal juvenile curfew ordinance that applies only in a municipality's high risk, high
crime areas or danger zones." Qutb v. Strauss, 11 F.3d 488, 496 n.l 1 (5th Cir. 1993). However, limiting
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curfews have confined their scope to municipal areas that experience the
highest crime rates. 79 However, such territorial curfews could force crime
to migrate to municipal areas outside the curfew's jurisdiction. Presumably,
the likelihood of such an occurrence is alleviated by city-wide curfews,
particularly in large cities,'80 because of the burdens associated with
having to travel outside the city.
Also, legislators should consider drafting curfews that contain provisions
for automatic repeal.' s' "Sunset provisions,"'8 2 which limit laws to
specific time periods, would deflect arguments that municipalities should
enact curfews only to quell temporary emergency situations. Automatic
repeal provisions would also rebut claims that legislators who draft
permanent curfews in response to emergency situations allow these
ordinances to remain on the books as unenforced, obsolete laws. Further,
curfews to these high crime regions would probably increase the risk of discriminatory enforcement
claims under the Fourteenth Amendment equal protection clause. See also Federle, supra note 54, at
1366 (discussing curfews used "as policing tool[s] in certain 'high crime' areas" and suggesting "that
the enactment and enforcement of curfew laws may be racially motivated."). See also supra note 170.
179. See, e.g., Austin, Tex., Ordinance 900531-C (Apr. 9, 1992) (demarcating boundaries,
specifically by street names, in two different downtown areas); ORLANDO, FL., CODE § 43-80 (1994)
(restricting an ordinance to the downtown areas including a garage, sidewalks, and "rights-of-way
abutting" streets). See also supra note 174.
180. In sprawling cities like Chicago or Los Angeles, especially considering the latter's
transportation problems, a city-wide curfew would be particularly effective in regulating and reducing
crime in specific areas without it migrating to other locales.
181. See Cahill, supra note 98, at 558 (proposing that legislators draft a temporary curfew under
a state's emergency police powers). However, temporary laws are problematic because, as opposed to
laws incorporating automatic repeal, they could become permanent legislation if the legislature fails to
affirmatively intervene after the temporary period has elapsed.
182. Sunset provisions automatically repeal legislation on a specific date. BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY defines a sunset law as:
A statute or provision in a law that requires periodic review of the rationale for the continued
existence of the particular law or the specific administrative agency or other governmental
function. The legislature must take positive steps to allow the law, agency, or functions to
continue in existence by a certain date or such will cease to exist.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1436 (6th ed. 1990). See, e.g., Dade County, Fla., Ordinance 94-1, § 15
(Jan. 18, 1994) (mandating that the ordinance expire five years from its inception) (held unconstitutional
in Pred v. Dade County, No. 94-03203-CA-21 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 1994); WASHINGTON, D.C., Juvenile
Curfew Amendment Act of 1995 (to be codified at D.C. CODE ANN. § 11-48 (1996)) (requiring
automatic repeal two years after enactment). Sunset provisions should probably be limited to between
six and eighteen month periods. This limitation would increase curfew viability by adhering to the
rationale for temporary curfews-that legislators need to enact curfews only to control juvenile crime
and victimization problems that have burgeoned into epidemic emergencies. See supra note 3 and
accompanying text.
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sunset provisions would permit legislatures to obtain community feed-
back, 8 3 review curfew effectiveness, and ultimately, require a new vote
to retain or amend an existing curfew.
8 4
Furthermore, curfew ordinances should protect juveniles from police and
parental abuse. Curfews should include provisions prohibiting officers from
handcuffing 85 juveniles unless the officer has reason to believe the
juvenile may be violent or dangerous. 8 6 A "no handcuffing" provision
would send a clear message to police officers to treat juveniles appropriate-
ly and would mollify curfew opponents who are concerned that officers
would treat juvenile curfew offenders like adult arrestees. Additionally,
ordinances should impose sanctions upon parents who negligently or
purposefully allow their children to remain in juvenile detention cen-
ters. 87 Otherwise, irresponsible parents could evade contact with law
enforcement officials and take advantage of the curfew by permitting their
children to remain in custody indefinitely.
Finally, municipalities should develop programs that facilitate enforce-
ment of the curfew. Public officials should work with police to design
interactive programs, possibly in connection with local parent-teacher
183. Hearings would effectively obtain feedback from law enforcement officials, parents, school
officials, and most importantly, affected juveniles. Indeed, some curfews contain reporting requirements
to keep legislators informed about curfew effectiveness. See DENVER, COLO., CODE § 34-62.5 (1994)
(requiring the city attorney's office to provide the city council with bi-monthly reports, including the
number of curfew citations, sentence imposed, offender ethnicity, sex, and age, and a map depicting the
geographic location of arrests).
184. See supra note 179.
185. A "no-handcuffin'g" provision surfaced in an early draft of Washington D.C.'s curfew but the
city council inexplicably deleted it from the final version. WASHINGTON, D.C., Juvenile Curfew
Amendment Act of 1995 (to be codified at D.C. CODE ANN. § 11-48 (1996)).
186. Police could determine whether a juvenile posed a threat by observing an offender's conduct,
or upon a finding that the juvenile has been arrested for prior violent offenses or has outstanding arrest
warrants.
187. See, e.g., New Orleans, La., Ordinance 16,498 (May 31, 1994) (establishing a fine up to $500
for a custodian to "unreasonably permit a minor to remain in city custody for more than twenty-four
hours after the minor has been detained"). The New Orleans curfew, in addition to including possible
$500 fines and 60 hours of community service for custodians, uses the curfew as a vehicle for
intervention with parents who allow their children to violate the curfew. See id. The ordinance permits
judges to mandate that parents "obtain counseling or attend classes or programs to improve parenting
and child-raising skills." Id. § l(e)(2). After three offenses by custodians, the ordinance requires that
the "record of the prosecution ... be transmitted by the City Attorney to the District Attorney, for
review for possible action under the Louisiana Children's Code." Id. § 1(e)(3). See also San Antonio,
Tex., Ordinance 76,419 (Sept. 3, 1992) (requiring, after a minor's second curfew violation, that the
Youth Services Division of the Community Initiatives Department schedule a conference with the
parents and the child concerning the curfew and the "[c]ity's expectation and requirement for parental
control").
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organizations, aimed at informing juveniles about curfew restrictions and,
more importantly, the underlying purpose of protecting juveniles from
crime. Sending police into schools to educate juveniles about curfew
purposes, crime reduction, and juvenile protection would mitigate
apprehension about the curfew and reduce animus towards police.
Additionally, to reduce travel costs and increase efficiency, 8' municipali-
ties should develop strategically located juvenile holding centers.8 9
VI. CONCLUSION
Juvenile curfews will never extinguish juvenile or nocturnal crime.
However, if legislators prudently draft constitutional provisions and
collaborate with police to enforce curfews, municipalities can utilize these
ordinances as effective crime-fighting tools. Thus, before hastily adopting
and enforcing curfews municipality officials should at least consider three
concerns: first, the tenuous constitutionality of nocturnal juvenile curfews;
second, the burdensome financial and societal costs of enacting and
enforcing curfews; and third, the need to implement curfews with other
programs designed to reduce juvenile crime.t"' Collectively these steps
will increase the possibility of achieving curfews' stated ends: crime
reduction and juvenile protection.
Kevin C. Siebert
188. A poorly structured detention program would serve as a disincentive for police enforcement
if most juvenile arrests lead to time-consuming drives and parent tracking expeditions.
189. For example, in Phoenix, it takes police only twenty minutes or so to transport juveniles to
one of the four detention centers staffed by "police officers and city recreation employees." Laura
Laughlin, Curfew Cuts Crime by Phoenix Juveniles: Violence is Down Under New Program, S.F.
CHRON., Sept. 11, 1993, at A9. At the center, police photograph, fingerprint, and file reports on
juveniles, and attempt to contact a parent or custodian. Id. Additionally, police interview juveniles
regarding their personal lives and if warranted, "direct them toward appropriate social services agencies
or programs." Id. However, Phoenix experienced severe human resource utilization problems because
police haphazardly scattered detention centers throughout the city. Telephone Interview with Marvin
Sondag, Assistant City Attorney, Phoenix, Ariz. (June 15, 1994). Phoenix police quickly rectified their
ill-advised plans and strategically located holding centers to ensure efficient curfew citation and
detention. Id.
190. For a discussion of programs municipalities have adopted to combat juvenile crime see supra
note 6. For a discussion of programs that could facilitate curfew enforcement see supra Section V.
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APPENDIX
The Dallas Curfew ordinance provides:
ORDINANCE NO. 21309
An ordinance amending Sections 31-33, "Curfew Hours for Minors," of
CHAPTER 31, "OFFENSES-MISCELLANEOUS," of the Dallas City Code,
as amended; repealing Section 2 of Ordinance No. 20966; defining terms;
creating offenses for minors, parents and guardians of minors, and business
establishments violating curfew regulations; providing defenses; providing for
enforcement by the police department; providing for waiver by the municipal
court of jurisdiction over a minor when required under the Texas Family
Code; providing for review of this ordinance in lieu of Ordinance No. 20966
within six months after the date of initial enforcement; providing a penalty
not to exceed $500; providing a saving clause; providing a severability
clause; and providing an effective date.
WHEREAS, the city council has determined that there has been an
increase in juvenile violence, juvenile gang activity, and crime by persons
under the age of 17 in the city of Dallas; and
WHEREAS, persons under the age of 17 are particularly susceptible by
their lack of maturity and experience to participate in unlawful and gang-
related activities and to be victims of older perpetrators of crime; and
WHEREAS, the city of Dallas has an obligation to provide for the
protection of minors from each other and from other persons, for the
enforcement of parental control over and responsibility for children, for the
protection of the general public, and for the reduction of the incidence of
juvenile criminal activities; and
WHEREAS, a curfew for those under the age of 17 will be in the interest
of the public health, safety, and general welfare and will help to attain the
foregoing objectives and to diminish the undesirable impact of such conduct
on the citizens of the city of Dallas; Now, Therefore,
BE IT ORDAINED BY THE CITY COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF
DALLAS:
SECTION 1. That Section 31-33, "Curfew Hours for Minors," of
CHAPTER 31, "OFFENSES-MISCELLANEOUS," of the Dallas City Code,
as amended, is amended to read as follows:
"SEC. 31-33. CURFEW HOURS FOR MINORS.
(a) Definitions. In this section:
(1) CURFEW HOURS means:
(A) 11:00 p.m. on any Sunday, Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, or
[VOL. 73:1711
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Thursday until 6:00 a.m. of the following day; and
(B) 12:01 a.m. until 6:00 a.m. on any Saturday or Sunday.
(2) EMERGENCY means an unforeseen combination of circumstances or
the resulting state that calls for immediate action. The term includes, but is
not limited to, a fire, a natural disaster, or automobile accident, or any
situation requiring immediate action to prevent serious bodily injury or loss
of life.
(3) ESTABLISHMENT means any privately-owned place of business
operated for a profit to which the public is invited, including but not limited
to any place of amusement or entertainment.
(4) GUARDIAN means:
(A) a person who, under court order, is the guardian of the person of a
minor; or
(B) a public or private agency with whom a minor has been placed by a
court.
(5) MINOR means any person under 17 years of age.
(6) OPERATOR means any individual, firm, association, partnership, or
corporation operating, managing, or conducting any establishment. The term
includes the members or partners of an association or partnership and the
officers of a corporation.
(7) PARENT means a person who is:
(A) a natural parent, adoptive parent, or step-parent of another person; or
(B) at least 18 years of age and authorized by a parent or guardian to have
the care and custody of a minor;
(8) PUBLIC PLACE means any place to which the public or a substantial
group of the public has access and includes, but is not limited to, streets,
highways, and the common areas of schools, hospitals, apartment houses,
office buildings, transport facilities and shops.
(9) REMAIN means to:
(A) linger or stay; or
(B) fail to leave premises when requested to do so by a police officer or
the owner, operator or other person in control of the premises.
(10) SERIOUS BODILY INJURY means bodily injury that creates a
substantial risk of death or that causes death, serious permanent disfigure-
ment, or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member
or organ.
(b) Offenses.
(1) A minor commits an offense if he remains in any public place or on
the premises of any establishment within the city during curfew hours.
(2) a parent or guardian of a minor commits an offense if he knowingly
permits, or by insufficient control allows, the minor to remain in any public
place or on the premises of any establishment within the city during curfew
hours.
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(3) The owner, operator, or any employee of an establishment commits an
offense if he knowingly allows a minor to remain upon the premises of the
establishment during curfew hours.
(c) Defenses.
(1) It is a defense to prosecution under Subsection (b) that the minor was:
(A) accompanied by the minor's parent or guardian;
(B) on an errand at the direction of the minor's parent or guardian, without
any detour or stop;
(C) in a motor vehicle involved in interstate travel;
(D) engaged in an employment activity, or going to or returning home
from an employment activity, without any detour or stop;
(E) involved in an emergency;
(F) on the sidewalk abutting the minor's residence or abutting the
residence of a next-door neighbor if the neighbor did not complain to the
police department about the minor's presence;
(G) attending an official school, religious, or other recreational activity
supervised by adults and sponsored by the city of Dallas, a civic organization,
or another similar entity that takes responsibility for the minor, or going to
or returning home from, without any detour or stop, an official school,
religious or other recreational activity supervised by adults and sponsored by
the city of Dallas, a civic organization, or another similar entity that takes
responsibility for the minor;
(H) exercising First Amendment rights protected by the United States
Constitution, such as the free exercise of religion, freedom of speech, and the
right of assembly; or
(I) married or had been married or had disabilities of minority removed in
accordance with Chapter 31 of the Texas Family Code.
(2) It is a defense to prosecution under Subsection (b)(3) that the owner,
operator, or employee of an establishment promptly notified the police
department that a minor was present on the premises of the establishment
during curfew hours and refused to leave.
(d) Enforcement.
Before taking any enforcement action under this section, a police officer
shall ask the apparent offender's age and reason for being in the public place.
The officer shall not issue a citation or make an arrest under this section
unless the officer reasonably believes that an offense has occurred and that,
based on any response and other circumstances, no defense in Subsection (c)
is present.
(e) Penalties.
(1) A person who violates a provision of this chapter is guilty of a separate
offense for each day or part of a day during which the violation is committed,
continued, or permitted. Each offense, upon conviction, is punishable by a
fine not to exceed $500.
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(2) When required by Section 51.08 of the Texas Family Code, as
amended, the municipal court shall waive original jurisdiction over a minor
who violates Subsection (b)(1) of this section and shall refer the minor to
juvenile court.
SECTION 2. That Section 2 of Ordinance No. 20966, passed by the city
council on June 12, 1991, is repealed.
SECTION 3. That within six months after the initial enforcement of this
ordinance, the city manager shall review this ordinance and report and make
recommendations to the city council concerning the effectiveness of and the
continuing need for the ordinance. The city manager's report shall specifically
include the following information:
(A) the practicality of enforcing the ordinance and any problems with
enforcement identified by the police department;
(B) the impact of the ordinance on crime statistics;
(C) the number of persons successfully prosecuted for a violation of the
ordinance; and
(D) the city's net cost of enforcing the ordinance.
SECTION 4. That CHAPTER 31 of the Dallas City Code, as amended,
shall remain in full force and effect, save and except as amended by this
ordinance.
SECTION 5. That the terms and provisions of this ordinance are severable
and are governed by Section 1-4 of CHAPTER 1 of the Dallas City Code, as
amended.
SECTION 6. That this ordinance shall take effect immediately from and
after its passage and publication in accordance with the provisions of the
Charter of the City of Dallas, and it is accordingly so ordained.
APPROVED AS TO FORM:
SAM A. LINDSAY, City Attorney
By Is! Lisa Christopherson
Assistant City Attorney
Passed June 10, 1992
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